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INTRODUCTION 
The human rights scene in New Zealand seethes with activity. 
International instruments, including but not confined to those 
which the state has ratified, influence the interpretation and 
development of the domestic law.I 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (Bill of Rights) enacted in 1990 to 
affirm, protect and promote human rights and affirm New Zealand's 
commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), was not entrenched by Parliament and contained no 
remedies section. Despite this status the courts have embraced the Bill 
of Rights, establishing in Simpson v Attorney-General (Baigent)2 that 
the judiciary has a general remedial jurisdiction under the Bill of 
Rights. Prior to this decision, the courts had established the specific 
remedy of "exclusion of evidence" for the proven breach of the 
criminal procedural rights under the Bill of Rights. Baigent is 
significant in that it opens the way for civil actions to be brought under 
the Bill of Rights, with the Court of Appeal showing that it is willing to 
give remedies that are more appropriate to the civil law such as 
corn pens a tion. 
Baigent is a controversial decision and has generated a heated academic 
debate. The main concern of those who oppose the decision is that in 
creating a new public law cause of action and establishing a general 
remedial jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights, the Court of Appeal 
breached section 4 of the Bill of Rights and assumed too much power. 
The aim of this paper is to add to the debate surrounding Baigent. In 
my examination and analysis of this decision the focus is on the 
international human rights reasoning behind the decision. 
The Court of Appeal referred to the ICCPR in Baigent first, in deciding 
that it had a remedial jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights and second, 
in determining that the public law cause of action under the Bill of 
Rights lay directly against the Crown and was not an action in tort 
1 Sir R Cooke, "A Sketch from the Blue Train - Non-discrimination and freedom of 
expression: the New Zealand contribution" [1994] NZLJ 10 at 10. 
2 [1994] 3 NZLR 667; 1 HRNZ 42, hereinafter Baigent. 
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where the Crown was vicariously liable. In determining the legitimacy 
of this reasoning, this paper first addresses the question of what is the 
current approach of the New Zealand courts towards international 
instruments? This question is answered by examining the response of 
the courts to the issue of whether the terms of international 
instruments should be mandatory considerations when administrative 
decisions are made and further, by examining the approach of the 
courts when they are asked to interpret statutes which mirror the 
provisions of international instruments and/ or there is a reference to a 
human rights instrument in the statute. It is argued that the traditional 
approach of the courts towards international instruments, which 
asserts that international instruments must be incorporated by 
domestic legislation before they can be given domestic legal effect, is 
being challenged by an emerging legal culture supportive of the use of 
international human rights instruments in the development of the 
domestic law. Seen in the context of this emerging legal culture, the 
reference to the ICCPR, by the Court of Appeal in Baigent can be argued 
to be legitimate. 
Having established that there is an emerging legal culture in New 
Zealand supporting the use of international human rights instruments 
in the development of the domestic law, my focus is widened to 
examine whether other common law jurisdictions namely Australia, 
England and Canada, are responding in a similar way to international 
human rights instruments. If it can be established that other common 
law jurisdictions are giving international instruments increased 
recognition in domestic law, this will endorse the emerging legal 
culture in New Zealand surrounding international instruments 
thereby reinforcing the Court of Appeal's use of the ICCPR in Baigent. 
The final part of this paper discusses the influencing factors behind this 
emerging legal culture. It is argued that in understanding the 
influencing factors behind this legal culture, we are able to get a better 
understanding of the legal culture itself and of why the judiciary are 
deciding human rights decisions the way they are. The influences 
2 
discussed include the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the 
Human Rights Committee, the Judicial Colloquia on international 
human rights issues, and the persistent arguments of certain 
enlightened New Zealand lawyers. 
The argument of this paper is that Baigent cannot be fully understood 
without reference to the underlying legal culture which is challenging 
the courts to recognise and give effect to international human rights 
instruments in domestic law. Seen in the context of this legal culture, 
the Court of Appeal's reference to the ICCPR in Baigent, is be argued to 
be legitimate. 
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1. Simpson v Attorney-General [ Baigent's case]. 
1.1 The Facts and Proceedings in the Courts 
On 18 October 1991, at about 7.30 am, a party of New Zealand police 
officers under a search warrant with a mistaken address, entered the 
home of Mrs Baigent in Lower Hutt and made a search. Mrs Baigent 
was not home at the time however the police continued their search 
despite being told by her son, a neighbour and her daughter, a barrister 
who talked to the police by phone, that they had the wrong address. In 
the plaintiff's statement of claim four causes of action were pleaded 
which can be summarised as - negligence in procuring the search 
warrant; trespass by entering or remaining on the plaintiff's land 
without lawful justification; abuse of process/misfeasance in a public 
office in executing the warrant; and violation of section 21 New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, by conducting an unreasonable search. 
A fifth cause of action of, trespass to goods, was added without 
opposition, to the statement of claim during the appeal hearing before 
the Court of Appeal. 
The Attorney-General, who was sued in respect of the police conduct, 
moved for an order striking out the whole of the plaintiff's statement 
of claim (Mrs Baigent died after the issue of proceedings but her estate 
sought to continue the claim). He argued that the provisions of sections 
38 and 39 Police Act 1958, sections 26 and 27 Crimes Act 1961 and 
section 6(5) Crown Proceedings Act 1950 constituted a complete bar to 
all the plaintiff's causes of action. Master Williams QC accepted this 
argument and ordered the plaintiff's claims to be struck out.3 A review 
of this decision was struck out by Grieg J in the High Court4, however 
he did grant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. In the Court of 
Appeal it was argued for the appellants that all causes of action should 
not have been struck out. The actions in tort were pleaded as tenable 
despite the statutory immunity provisions in the Police Act, the Crimes 
Act and the Crown Proceedings Act. It was also argued that the Bill of 
3 Baigent v AttornetJ General [1990-92] 3 NZBORR 400. 
4 Baigent v Attorney General unreported, High Court, Wellington, 15 July 1993, 
CP850/91, Grieg J. 
4 
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Rights created its own cause of action in public law, independent of the 
other tortious actions and so a cause of action for the breach of section 
21 of the Bill of Rights arose in this case. 
1.2 The Court of Appeal's Decision 
A five-member Court of Appeal (Cooke P, Casey, Hardie Boys, McKay JJ 
and Gault J dissenting) allowed the appeal, reinstating not only the 
causes of action alleging trespass and abuse of process/misfeasance in 
public office but also the cause of action based on the alleged breach of 
section 21 of the Bill of Rights. In allowing the cause of action under 
section 21 of the Bill of Rights, the majority of the court held that it was 
not a private law action in tort where the Crown was vicariously liable 
but a public law action directly against the Crown.s The effect of this 
decision was two-fold. First, the decision widened the court's remedial 
jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights to include compensation for a 
proven breach of an affirmed right. Second, by establishing the cause of 
action as one in public law not an action in tort, the immunity 
provided by section 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 did not 
apply to the action. 
1.3 The Reasoning of the Court of Appeal 
In deciding that there was a cause of action under the Bill of Rights for 
an alleged breach of an affirmed right, the Court of Appeal first had to 
establish that even though there was no remedies section in the Bill of 
Rights, the Court still had a remedial jurisdiction under the Bill of 
Rights. The Court of Appeal in establishing its remedial jurisdiction ., 
placed significant emphasis on what it interpreted to be the purpose of 
the Bill of Rights as set out in the Long Title. The Long Title to the Bill 
of Rights provides that it is: 
An Act 
(a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in New Zealand; and 
(b) To affirm New Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that to find that there was no remedy 
5 Baigent (supra n 2) at 675;56(Cooke P), 690;72(Casey J), 697;80(Hardie Boys J), 
716;102(McKay J). 
against the Crown for the breach of a right would be incompatible wi
th 
both but particularly the second purpose of the Long Title, whi
ch 
affirms New Zealand's commitment to the ICCPR.6 Article 2(3) of t
he 
ICCPR provides that: 
3.Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein 
recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons act
ing 
in an official capacity; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his ri
ght 
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or 
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided 
for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the 
possibilities of judicial remedy; 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that as article 2(3) of the ICCPR provid
es 
that each State Party is obliged to provide an effective remedy for
 a 
breach of a Covenant right, Parliament intended, by enacting the Bill 
of 
Rights which affirms the ICCPR (including article 2(3)), that remedi
es 
would also be provided in the domestic law for a breach of lh
c nm of 
Rights. Casey J gives the most succinct reasoning on this point. He 
states:7 
I do not regard the absence of a remedies provision in the Act as an imp
ediment 
to the Court's ability to 'develop the possibilities of judicial remedy' a
s 
envisaged in art 3(b). The rights and freedoms affirmed are fundament
al to a 
civilised society and justify a liberal purposive interpretation of the A
ct, even 
though it has not been constitutionally entrenched and has the same st
atus as 
ordinary legislation. Its purpose being the affirmation of New Zealan
d's 
commitment to the Covenant (including art 3 (b)), it would be wrong to c
onclude 
that Parliament did not intend there to be any remedy for those whose
 rights 
have been infringed ... I do not accept that Parliament intended it to b
e what 
most would regard as no more than legislative window-dressing, of no
 practical 
consequence, in the absence of appropriate remedies for those whose ri
ghts and 
freedoms have been violated. 
The Court of Appeal in arguing that it had a remedial jurisdictio
n 
under the Bill of Rights also placed reliance on the fact that Ne
w 
Zealand signed the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR on 26 M
ay 
1989, which allows individuals to obtain a remedy from the Unit
ed 
Nations Human Rights Committee for a breach of their Covena
nt 
rights. It was reasoned that as the Bill of Rights affirms the ICCPR an
d 
reflects Covenant rights, New Zealand citizens ought not have to reso
rt 
6 ibid., at 676;57(Cooke P), 691;73(Casey J), 699;82(Hardie Boys J),718;104(Mc
Kay J) 
7 ibid., at 691;73-4. 
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to the Human Rights Committee or any other international tribunal to 
obtain an adequate remedy for the breach of those rights, they should be 
able to obtain relief from their own courts.8 
A further reason why the Court of Appeal held that it had a remedial 
jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights, followed from their purposive 
approach to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Cooke P 
emphasised the importance of a straightforward and generous 
approach to the provisions of the Bill of Rights which ultimately 
required the courts to grant remedies for the infringement of rights. 9 
This argument was reinforced by Cooke P's interpretation of section 3 
of the Act. He stated that as section 3 makes it clear that the Bill of 
Rights applies to the actions of the judiciary, it follows from this that 
the Bill of Rights is binding on the courts and therefore the courts 
would fail in their duty if they refused to give effective remedies to 
individuals whose rights had been infringed.10 Cooke P also issued a 
warning against Parliament and the Courts only giving lip-service to 
human rights.11 Hardie Boys J also stressed the rights-centered 
approach of the courts towards the Bill of Rights and how this required 
the courts to provided an appropriate remedy to a person whose rights 
had been infringed whether that be a remedy of exclusion of evidence 
or compensation. The essence of his reasoning on this ground is 
contained in the following statement:12 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, if it is to be no more than an empty 
statement, is a commitment by the Crown that those who in the three branches 
of Government exercise its functions, powers and duties will observe the rights 
that the Bill affirms. It is I consider implicit in that commitment, indeed 
essential to its worth, that the Courts are not only to observe the Bill in the 
discharge of their own duties but are able to grant appropriate and effective 
remedies where rights have been infringed. 
The fact that other international jurisdictions have shown that they are 
willing to give remedies for the breach of fundamental human rights 
provided a further reason why the Court of Appeal held that it had a 
8 ibid., at 691;73-4(Casey J), 700;83(Hardie Boys J). 
9 ibid ., at 676;57. 
10 ibid., at 676;57. 
11 ibid., at 676;58. 
12 ibid ., at 702;86. 
7 
remedial jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights.13 Hardie Boys J focused 
on this ground of reasoning, citing authority from England, India, 
Ireland and the United States in support. The jurisprudence of Ireland 
was given special emphasis as the written constitution guaranteeing 
fundamental human rights in Ireland, like the Bill of Rights, does not 
contain a remedies provision. The absence of a remedies clause has not 
stopped the Irish courts from developing remedies for infringements. 
Hardie Boys J used the similarity between the Irish Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights to bolster the argument why it is legitimate for the 
New Zealand courts to provide remedies for a breach of the Bill of 
Rights, even though there is no remedies provision in the Bill of 
Rights.14 
The Court of Appeal having concluded that it had a remedial 
jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights, went on to classify the remedy as 
one in public law not tort. The Court gave two reasons for this 
conclusion. The main reason was that other international jurisdictions 
had classified similar causes of action for breaches of fundamental 
human rights as public law actions, where the state was primarily 
liable. The leading case cited on this point was the Privy Council 
decision Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2)15, 
with authority from India and Ireland also being cited.16 The second 
reason given by the Court of Appeal was more subtle. Casey and McKay 
JJ both reasoned that a public law remedy seemed more appropriate 
considering the focus in the Bill of Rights on public responsibility and 
also because the Bill of Rights affirmed New Zealand's commitment to 
the ICCPR, where under article 3(2) it is the State itself which 
undertakes to ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms are 
violated has an effective remedy.17 
13 ibid., at 677;58-9(Cooke P), 692;74-5(Casey J), 700-02;83-86(Hardie Boys J) . 
14 ibid., at 701;85. 
15 [1979] AC 385. 
16 Baigent (supra n 2) at 677;58-9(Cooke P), 692;74-S(Casey J), 700-2;83-86(Hardie Boys 
J), 718;104(McKay J). 
17 ibid., at 691;73-4(Casey J), 718;104(McKay J). 
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1.4 The Debate Surrounding Baigent 
The wisdom of the Court of Appeal's decision in Baigent has been the 
subject of a very heated academic debate. Four strands of argument are 
apparent in this debate, two of which challenge the decision with the 
other two offering support. The first strand of argument which 
challenges the decision is advocated by Dr J Allan.18 He argues that the 
Court of Appeal by creating a separate and distinct cause of action for 
the breach of an affirmed right under the Bill of Rights, used the Bill of 
Rights to avoid the limitation on the vicarious liability of the Crown in 
tort contained in section 6 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950, thereby 
overriding section 4 of the Bill of Rights. He stresses the non-
entrenched status of the Bill of Rights, essentially seeing the issue at 
stake in Baigent in terms of the allocation of power between parliament 
and the judiciary. It is his argument that the Bill of Rights does not give 
the judiciary a remedial power and certainly does not allow them to 
override other statutes such as the Crown Proceedings Act to assume 
that remedial power.19 
The second strand of argument which challenges the Court of Appeal's 
decision is advocated by Professor J A Smillie.20 He attacks the decision 
by arguing that the legislative history of the Bill of Rights does not 
support the view that Parliament intended to confer new enforcement 
powers on the courts under the Bill of Rights. Like Dr J Allan he 
stresses the ordinary status of the Bill of Rights, arguing that the 
ultimate sanction for the violation of the Bill of Rights should be 
political rather than legal.21 Underlying Professor Smillie's criticism of 
Baigent is a concern for the fate of tortious liability in light of this new 
cause of action under the Bill of Rights. If the new cause of action 
under the Bill of Rights is seen as a complete substitute for the tortious 
liability of the Crown and its individual officers, then Professor Smillie 
18 J Allan, "Speaking with the Tongues of Angels: The Bill of Rights, Simpson and the 
Court of Appeal" (1994) 1 BORB 2. 
19 ibid., at 6. 
20 JA Smillie, "The Allure of 'Rights Talk': Baigent's case in the Court of Appeal" 
(1994) 8(2) OLR 188. 
21 ibid., at 196. 
I .,. 
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fears the unique and unfettered jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of 
such an action, it being subject to none of the common law and 
statutory limitations that confine the power of the court in respect of 
both the incidence of tort liability and the heads of actionable damage.22 
In seeking to defend the decision and dismiss the arguments of its 
critics, Dr R Harrison raises a third strand of argument in this debate.23 
In seeing the central issue in Baigent as the extent and nature of the 
Court's remedial jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights, Dr Harrison 
dismisses Dr Allan's argument which suggests that the Court of 
Appeal's central concern in its decision was how to avoid the statutory 
immunities of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950. Dr Harrison argues 
that the immunity from suit under the Crown Proceedings Act was not 
an issue for the Court once they had accepted the argument that the 
basis of liability in terms of the Crown Proceedings Act was section 
3(2)(c) which is not concerned with tortious liability.24 Dr Harrison also 
took issue with Dr Allan's assertion, that the effect of the Court of 
Appeal's decision in Baigent was to entrench the Bill of Rights . Dr 
Harrison argues that in line with conventional Diceyan theory, 
Parliament can overturn or modify the result in Baigent at any time 
thus Dr Allan's argument was "seriously flawed" .25 Responding to the 
argument that the legislative history of the Bill of Rights denied the 
courts a remedial jurisdiction, Dr Harrison endorsed the approach of 
the Court of Appeal which preferred to put this uncertain legislative 
historical material aside, focusing instead on the actual wording of the 
Bill of Rights, particularly section 3 and the Long Title.26 
The fourth strand of argument which can be interpreted to be 
supportive of the decision, concerns the decision's international 
human rights element.27 J Dawson argues that as well as vindicating 
breaches of the Bill of Rights, the Baigent remedy has the purpose of 
22 ibid., at 200. 
23 R Harrison, "He That Is Without Sophistry, Let Him Cast the First Epithet" (1995) 
2 BORB 18. 
24 ibid., at 21. 
25 ibid., at 20. 
26 R Harrison, "A Brief Rejoinder to a Reply to Dr James Allan" (1995) 3 BORB 43 at 45 
27 J Dawson, "Simpson Liability" (1994) 1 BORB 8. 
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affirming and promoting New Zealand's adherence to international 
human rights law, particularly the ICCPR. He poses the question of 
how can New Zealand sensibly purport to accede to the Optional 
Protocol and the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee but 
nevertheless resist the application of international human rights 
principles which require effective domestic remedies to be available? 
He goes on to suggest that perhaps the Court of Appeal through the 
Baigent decision is forcing us to recognise the full significance of our 
own desire to comply with international human rights norms and the 
consequent need for imaginative thinking about the sources of our 
law.28 
This debate concerning the wisdom of the Court of Appeal's decision in 
Baigent shows that the decision has by no means been accepted by all 
members of the legal profession. The unreconcilable views of Dr J 
Allan and Dr R Harrison arc based on totally different conceptions of 
what the role of the judiciary is with respect to the interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights. Dr Allan advocates that the Bill of Rights gives the 
judiciary no new powers, with Dr Harrison supporting a rights-
centered approach to interpretation of the Bill of Rights, under which 
the judiciary have a duty to provide remedies for breaches of the Bill of 
Rights. The strand of argument which has not received any significant 
attention is that of J Dawson. International human rights 
considerations were a major part of the reasoning behind the decision 
therefore in any analysis of the wisdom of the decision these 
considerations must be addressed. 
28 ibid., at 9. 
11 
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2. An Analysis of Baigent - The International Element. 
2.1 The Approach of the Courts Towards International Treaties 
International treaties which set down rules and norms of international 
law imposing binding obligations on those States which ratify them, 
are one source of international law.29 The extent to which 
international treaties are also a source of domestic law is 'substantially 
conditioned' on whether the legal system of a State is monist or 
dualist.30 A monist legal system adheres to the view that there is only 
one system of law, with international law being an element within it, 
alongside the domestic law of the State. International treaties in a 
monist legal system are self-executing and so directly enforceable in the 
domestic courts. A dualist legal system views international and 
domestic law as separate, with international law being inferior to 
domestic law. The common law legal system is dualist and as such the 
traditional approach of the common law courts towards international 
treaties and covenants is that they must be incorporated by domestic 
legislation before they can be given domestic legal effect by the courts.31 
Despite this traditional approach of the common law courts towards 
international treaties, a principle of construction exists whereby a 
statute which is ambiguous will be interpreted in accordance with 
international treaties, there being a presumption that the legislature 
does not intend to legislate in breach of international law or a specific 
treaty obligation.32 The courts have also held international treaties to 
be aids to statutory interpretation where a statute itself implements a 
29 For general commentary on the status of international treaties in domestic law see P 
A Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (1993); S A de Smith 
& R Brazier, Constitutional & Administrative Law (6th ed 1989); P H Lane, A Manuel 
of Australian Constitutional Law (5th ed 1991); KW Ryan (ed), International Law in 
Australia, (2nd ed 1984); H M Kindred (ed), International Law Chiefly as Interpreted 
&Applied in Canada (5th ed 1993). 
30 R Higgins, Problems & Process - International Law and How We Use It, (1994) 205. 
31 see The Parlement Beige (1879) 4 P.D. 129; Walker v Baird [1892) AC 491; Attorney-
General (Canada) v Attorney-General (Ontario) [1937) AC 326; Blackburn v Attorney-
General [1971) 2 All ER 1380; Bradley v The Commonwealth (1973) 128 CLR 557; Ashby 
v Minister of Immigration (1981) 1 NZLR 222. 
32 Salomon v Commissioner of C11sto111s & Excise (1967] 2 QB 116; R v Secretary of Stale 
for the Home Department, ex p Bhajan Singh (1976) QB 198; Garland v British Rail 
Engineering Ltd [1983) 2 AC 751; Huakina v Waikato Valley Authority [1987) 2 NZLR 
188 at 217. 
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treaty33 or where the treaty represents a legislative policy apparent in 
the statute.34 
It has been argued that the way that the courts approach the question of 
the relationship between international treaties and domestic law is also 
conditioned by 'legal culture'.35 Legal culture describes the attitudes and 
responses of both judges and lawyers towards international law and its 
relationship to domestic law. In a legal culture where both judges and 
lawyers are familiar with international law, it will be referred to on a 
routine basis and its introduction into litigation will attract no special 
comment or interest. However another legal culture exists where a 
judge and lawyer have not studied and are therefore unfamiliar with 
international law. In this legal culture, international law will be treated 
as some exotic branch of the law to be avoided if at all possible. 
Although it is to be expected that a dualist legal system will encourage 
the latter legal culture, this is not necessarily so. 
2.2 Baigent and the ICCPR 
In Baigent the Court of Appeal refer to the ICCPR for two reasons. First, 
to reinforce their argument that they have a remedial jurisdiction 
under the Bill of Rights, and second to reason that the cause of action 
under the Bill of Rights was a public law action directly against the 
State, not one in tort. The Court of Appeal therefore used the ICCPR 
not simply as an aid to interpreting the Bill of Rights but effectively 
imported article 3(2), the remedies provision of the ICCPR, into the Bill 
of Rights. In a common law legal system which adheres to the dualist 
view of the law, this use of the ICCPR is questionable and so the 
wisdom of the Court of Appeal's decision in Baigent is placed in doubt. 
However, as it can be argued that the legal culture also determines how 
the legal profession will respond to the relationship between 
international law and the domestic law, an investigation of this factor 
may show that the Court of Appeal's use of the Convention is 
33 King-Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531; Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981
] AC 251. 
34 Van-Gorkom v Attorney-General [1977] 1 NZLR 535. 
35 R Higgins, Problems &Process - International Law and How We Use It (1994) 2
06. 
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legitimate, in that it reflects the current legal culture surrounding 
international instruments and the domestic law. 
2.3 The New Zealand Courts and International Instruments 
The most common issue which has arisen in New Zealand and other 
common law courts in relation to the effect of international 
instruments on domestic law, is whether their terms should be 
mandatory considerations when administrative decisions are made. 
The response of the courts to this issue will help determine the status 
of international instruments in domestic law and be a useful indicator 
of the legal culture which surrounds them. In Ashby v Minister of 
Immigration36 the New Zealand Court of Appeal firmly endorsed the 
traditional approach of the courts towards international instruments. 
However the 1993 decision of Court of Appeal, Tavita v Minister of 
Immigration37, has been argued to have "severely eroded" the Ashby 
principle and thus the traditional approach towards international 
treaties.38 In order to appreciate the change of approach that Tavita 
represents and to analyse what this in turn says about the legal culture, 
Ashby must first be examined. 
Ashby v Minister of Immigration 
Ashby arose because of opposition to the decision of the Minister of 
Immigration under section 14 of the Immigration Act 1964, to issue 
temporary entry permits to the Springbok Rugby Team so that they 
could tour New Zealand in 1981. The appellants raised two arguments 
to this decision. First, they argued that because of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
of 1965 (CERD) the Minister had no power or jurisdiction to grant the 
entry permits to the team. Second, they argued that as the existence and 
terms of the CERD were relevant to the exercise of the Minister's 
discretion he was bound to take them into consideration. 
36 (1981] 1 NZLR 222, hereinafter Ashby. 
37 (1994] 2 NZLR 257, hereinafter Tavita. 
38 J B Elkind, "Ashby v Minister of Immigration: Overruled? "(1994] NZLJ 95 at 120. 
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With regard to the first argument, the Court of Appeal adhered to the 
traditional approach of the courts towards the effect of international 
instruments on domestic law, holding that the CERD was not part of 
New Zealand law and consequently it could not override the 
Immigration Act by depriving the Minister of authority to grant entry 
permits to the Springbok.39 Richardson J while acknowledging the dicta 
of Scarman LJ in Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority40, that 
courts should pay very serious regard to international obligations and 
interpret legislation and common law principles consistently with 
them, added the caveat that where domestic legislation is clear and 
urn:mbiguous its terms must be given effect even if this means that 
New Zealand's international obligations will be ignored. In concluding 
that the language of s 14(1) of the Immigration Act was "clear and 
unambiguous" Richardson J refused to hold that the Minister's 
discretion was fettered by the CERD.41 
Responding to the appellants second argument, that the Minister was 
bound in law to give specific consideration to the existence and terms 
of the CERD in exercising his statutory discretion, the Court of Appeal 
applied the principle established in CREEDNZ Inc v Governor 
General42 that:43 
it is only when a statute expressly or by implication identifies a consideration 
as one to which regard must be had that the Courts can interfere for failure to 
take it into account. The mere fact that the consideration is one that could 
properly or reasonably be taken into account is not enough. 
In concluding that immigration policy is linked to foreign policy and 
can be a "sensitive and often controversial political issue" the Court of 
Appeal decided that the CERD was not a mandatory relevant 
consideration to the Minister's discretionary decision.44 Despite reached 
this decision Cooke and Somers JJ were willing to accept that:45 
even in statutes concerned with immigration and policy in that regard ... a 
certain factor might be of such overwhelming or manifest importance that the 
39 Ashby (supra n 36) at 224 (Cooke J). 
40 [1978] QB 36 at 48. 
41 Ashby (supra n 36) at 229. 
42 [1981] 1 NZLR 172. 
43 Ashby (supra n 36) at 225. 
44 ibid. , at 226(Cooke P). 
45 ibid., at 226(Cooke P), 233(Somers J) . 
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Courts might hold that Parliament could not possibly have meant to allow it to 
be ignored. Such a situation would shade into the area where no reasonable 
Minister could overlook a certain consideration or reach a certain result. 
This obiter comment of Cooke J, affirmed by Somers J, qualifies their 
statements that international instruments are not "binding" in 
domestic law unless they have been incorporated by legislation. This is 
because in some circumstances it could be argued that an international 
instrument is a factor of such "manifest importance" that no 
reasonable Minister could ignore it in making a decision. It has been 
suggested that a reason why the CERD was not such a factor was 
because it did not refer to sporting contacts.46 
Despite these comments of Cooke and Somers JJ, Ashby is the leading 
New Zealand authority reinforcing the traditional approach of the 
courts that international instruments are only part of the law of New 
Zealand if they have been incorporated by an Act of Parliament. Ashby 
has been followed in a number of cases, with the most recent case being 
Vaematahau v Minister of Immigration.47 In this case, which involved 
judicial review proceedings in the High Court, Jaine J, in citing Ashby 
and the English authority R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex p Brind48, held that the Minister of Immigration is not 
required to take international treaties into account when determining 
appeals under the Immigration Act as international treaty obligations 
are not binding in domestic law until they have been incorporated in 
that way. Ashby was also upheld by McGechan J in Federated Farmers v 
NZ Post.49 The appellants in this case argued that the defendant 
Ministers as the major shareholders of New Zealand Post, had a duty to 
make sure that New Zealand Post acts in such a way as not to breach 
New Zealand's international obligations under the Universal Postal 
Convention. McGechan J refused to hold that the Ministers had such a 
duty, as this would amount to an indirect enforcement of an 
international convention which is not part of the domestic law. 
46 J Elkind and A Shaw, "The Municipal Enforcement of the Prohibition Against Racial 
Discrimination: a Case Study on New Zealand and the 1981 Springbox Tour" In The 
British Year Book of International Law 1984 (1985) 189 at 227. 
47 [1993] NZAR 88. 
48 [1991] 1 All ER 720, hereinafter Brind. 
49 [1990-92] 3 NZBORR 339. 
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l • By endorsing the traditional approach of the courts towards international instruments, Ashby and the decisions which have 
followed it, promote a legal culture which does not view international 
instruments favourably. However there are signs in these decisions 
that the legal culture is open to change. First, the fact that counsel are 
raising arguments in judicial review proceedings concerning 
international instruments shows that there is a growing consciousness 
amongst lawyers of the importance of international instruments to the 
development of the domestic law. Second, the comments of Cooke and 
Somers JJ in Ashby, which envisage that there may be some factors 
which are of such "manifest importance" that no reasonable Minister 
could ignore them, are encouraging and perhaps indicate that the 
judiciary do recognise that international treaties may be significant in 
some circumstances. 
Tavita v Minister of Immigration 
The appellant in this case, Mr Tavita, was a Western Samoan citizen 
and an 'over stayer' in New Zealand. He had been issued with a 
removal warrant under the Immigration Act 1961 and had appealed to 
the Minister of Immigration on humanitarian grounds seeking a 
cancellation of the warrant or a reduction of the five year prohibition 
on returning to New Zealand. The appeal was unsuccessful and so 
judicial review proceedings were brought in the High Court on Mr 
Tavita's behalf, seeking an interim order quashing the removal order 
and directing a rehearing of the applicant's appeals to the Minister. 
McGechan J refused the application for reviewso and so Tavita appealed 
to the Court of Appeal. 
In the Court of Appeal the appellant placed considerable reliance on 
New Zealand's international obligations under the ICCPR, its first 
Optional Protocol and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child 1989. It was argued that the Minister in deciding the appeal 
should have had regard to the rights of the family and the child laid 
down in these instruments. In response, the Crown's main argument 
50 Tavita v Minister of Immigration unreported, High Court, Wellington, 3 Novemb
er 
1993, CP No 422/93, McGechan J. 
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was that the Minister of Immigration was entitled to ignore these 
international instruments. The Court of Appeal responded by calling 
this:51 
an unattractive argument, apparently implying that New Zealand's adherence 
to the international instruments has been at least partly window-dressing. 
The Court of Appeal went on to cast doubt on the decision of the House 
of Lords, Brind, which also adheres to the traditional approach with 
respect to international instruments, referring to it "as in some respects 
a controversial decision".52 Reference was also made to the fact that 
New Zealand has signed the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR which 
allows individuals to petition the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee. It was argued that this was a factor why the court should be 
hesitant before accepting the Crown's argument, that the Minister was 
entitled to ignore international obligations.53 Despite these dramatic 
statements and a recognition by Cooke P that "the law as to the bearing 
on domestic law of international human rights and instruments 
declaring them is undergoing evolution"54, the Court of Appeal 
declined to override Ashby. Instead the Court of Appeal adjourned the 
appeal and directed the Minister to reconsider the appellant's 
application in light of his changed family circumstances and the 
relevant international instruments. 
Tavita represents a significant change of approach of the judiciary 
towards international instruments. With the judiciary becoming more 
aware of the importance of international human rights instruments 
and the relevance that they have to arguments involving human 
rights, Tavita is indicative of a legal culture which is more supportive 
of international instruments and their use in domestic law. The 
positive responses of various legal commentators to Tavi ta are 
important in reinforcing this change of approach towards international 
instruments. J B Elkind notes that, Tavita "seriously erodes" the Ashby 
principle even though it does not specifically overrule it. In his view 
Tavita signals that international law is going to become much more 
51 Tavitn (supra n 37) at 266. 
52 idem. 
53 idem. 
54 idem. 
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important in New Zealand's domestic law and that the legal profession 
should be aware of this.SS B O'Callahan views Tavita as significant in 
that it gives a very strong indication that if the Court of Appeal were 
asked to directly decide in the future the main issue in Tavita they 
would be likely to hold that, in the absence of any express direction to 
the contrary, the Executive must take into account relevant 
international obligations in the exercise of discretionary power.56 B 
O'Callahan further argues that Tavita confirms that powers vested by 
statute do not exist in a vacuum, implying that where statutes overlap 
in subject matter with international obligations these obligations will 
be important to the interpretation of the statute.57 P Hunt and Professor 
M Bedggood also interpret Tavi ta as casting considerable doubt on 
Ashby and state that:58 
As never before the executive is under pressure at least to consider, if not to 
give effect to its international human rights obligations whenever exercising a 
discretionary power. 
By being supportive of Tavita these legal commentators can be seen to 
be part of the legal culture which is giving increased recognition to 
international instruments in domestic law. To see if the the judiciary 
has also been supportive of Tavita and the change of approach towards 
international instruments that it represents, it is necessary to examine 
in detail the reaction of the lower courts and tribunals to the decision. 
Family Court 
Tavita has received a favourable response from the Family Court. The 
decision is seen as particularly relevant to the area of family law in that 
it discusses the rights of a child and as Ian Hassall, a former 
Commissioner for Children has noted, "recognises the legitimacy of 
reference in New Zealand Courts to the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child".59 In Re the S Children (No3)60 Judge B D Inglis QC 
in the Napier Family Court had to decide whether to confirm the 
55 J B Elkind, "Ashby v Minister of Immigration : Overruled" [1994] NZLJ 95 at 120 
56 Case Notes: B O'Callahan (1994) 7(3) AULR 762 at 765. 
57 ibid. , at 765. 
58 P Hunt and M Bedggood, " The International Law Dimension of Human Rights in 
New Zealand" in G Huscroft & P Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms (1995) 56. 
59 I Hassall, "N.Z. and the UN Convention - Tav ita" (1994) 12 Children 6 at 7. 
60 (1994-5) 12 FRNZ 430. 
19 
~-
custody of two girls who were in the custody of the Director-General of 
Social Welfare because of their vulnerability in their own family 
situation towards sexual abuse. In deciding this issue, Judge Inglis had 
to balance the integrity of the family against the welfare and interests of 
the child as required under sections 5, 6, and 13 of the Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (CYPFA). The court held that the 
interests and welfare of the child, in a case such as the present, must be 
the deciding factors and so the custody of the Director-General of Social 
Welfare was confirmed. In reaching this conclusion the court relied on 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. 
Following Tavita, the court held that any difficulty in the balancing 
exercise under the CYPFA is resolved by reference to the Convention. 
This was because the relevant provisions of the CYPFA were seen as 
essentially a reflection of what was in the Convention.61 The decision 
of Judge P von Dadelszen in the Palmerson North Family Court, Re the 
W Children62, again illustrates the encouragement that Tavita has 
given the Family Court to use the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in its decision-making. This case concerned the custody of three 
young children and the issue of whether they should be returned to 
their mother. In trying to resolve the interaction between the principles 
in sections 4, 5, 6 and 13 of the CYPFA, the court held that a "useful 
touchstone" could be found in the Convention. More importantly 
however, the court went on to hold that in following the approach of 
the Court of Appeal in Tavita:63 
... when the Family Court is required to exercise its discretion ... it is legitimate, 
even essential, to fall back on that Convention when the Court is required to 
ensure that the fundamental rights of the child as proclaimed in its articles are 
recognised and protected. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child is clearly important in the 
Family Court decisions of Re the W Children and Re the S Children 
(No3). The Convention is considered relevant to these cases first, 
because the provisions of the CYPFA are a reflection of the 
Convention's provisions and second, because the Court of Appeal in 
Tavita made it very clear that in cases concerning the rights of children 
61 ibid., at 442. 
62 (1994-5) 12 FRNZ 548. 
63 ibid., at 558. 
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decision-makers should not ignore the relevant provisions of the 
Convention. 
Although Tavita has been followed by the Family Court, legal 
commentator Graeme Austin is not so convinced about the enhancing 
effect on family law that the decision will have.64 He argues that 
existing processes and approach of the New Zealand Family Court, as 
they bear on the welfare of the individual children who come before 
the Court, already provide a large measure of rights protection, 
implying that the Convention will add little that is new.65 He goes on 
to argue that where in family law statutes, such as the Matrimonial 
Property Act 1976 and the Child Support Act 1991, there is strict 
legislative guidance as to the exercise of discretionary power or the 
scope of a child's rights, it will be very difficult to persuade a court that 
the Convention should affect the exercise of the discretions or the 
child's rights.66 Austin, although he accepts the significance of Tavita 
for New Zealand's domestic jurisprudence, believes that international 
human rights norms should be viewed in family law as a supplement 
to, rather than a substitute for, the careful and individualised analysis 
of the facts of individual lives, for which the Family Court is 
deservedly renowned. 
Immigration cases 
Tavita and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1989 have also been referred to by tribunals and courts in subsequent 
Immigration cases. The Deportation Review Tribunal has viewed 
Tavita favourably, with McGechan J in the High Court being more 
cautious in his response. In Etuati v Minister of Immigration67, the 
Deportation Review Tribunal followed Tavita holding that the absence 
of reference to the Convention of the Rights of the Child 1989 and the 
ICCPR in the Immigration Act 1987, did not relieve the Minister of 
64 G Austin, "The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child - and domestic law" (1994) 
1 BFLJ 63. 
65 ibid., at 88 . 
66 see Andrews v Andrews [1994] NZFLR 39 where Hammond J considered that though 
the express objects of the Child Support Act 1991 include the child's right to support, 
the extent of the right only goes so far as the detailed provisions of the Act provide. 
67 [1994] NZAR 378. 
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Immigration or the Tribunal itself from the need to apply their 
principles. The Tribunal therefore determined the appeal, which 
concerned a deportation order, on what it considered to be the 
principles of these international Conventions. 
McGechan J in the High Court has responded less favourably towards 
Tavita. Nikoo v Removal Review Authority68 was an appeal against 
the decision of the Removal Review Authority (RRA), which had 
dismissed the appeals against the removal orders of two Iranian 
brothers. One of the grounds of the appeal was that the RRA had erred 
in law when finding that the separation of one of the appellants from 
his child was not an exceptional circumstance pursuant to section 
63 B(2)(a) of the Immigration Act 1987. McGechan J, although he 
acknowledged Tavita and the powerful indications that the State 
should not ignore their international obligations, went on to construe 
the meaning of the word "exceptional" in section 63 B(2)(a) of the 
Immigration Act 1987 without attempting to give it a broad 
interpretation that would have been consistent with article 23(1) of the 
ICCPR which states: 
1 The Family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is 
entitled to protection by Society and State. 
This conservative approach of McGechan J towards international 
instruments is briefly seen again in the non-immigration related case 
Taiaroa & Others v Minister of Justice69, where in citing Tavita he 
states:70 
International law does not create directly enforceable rights, unless 
incorporated in domestic legislation. The new recognition promoted by Tav ita v 
Minister of Immigration (1994) 2 NZLR 257, encouraging Ministers to have 
regard to New Zealand's international obligations in the course of 
administrative decisions, allows appropriate account to be taken. It does not, 
however, convert international law into municipal law. 
This is a rather conservative approach towards Tavita considering the 
scope it gives judges to develop the law in the area of international 
obligations. It seems that in the area of immigration law the 
Deportation Review Tribunal is prepared to take a more robust 
68 (1994] NZAR 509. 
69 unreported, High Court, Wellington, 4 October 1994, CP 99/94, McGechan J. 
70 ibid. , at 20. 
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approach towards international instruments in the wake of Tavita 
than the High Court. This conservatism in the High Court may be due, 
with all respect, to the personal attitude of McGechan J towards 
international instruments. It was his decision in the High Court that 
the Court of Appeal overturned in Tavita71 and his subsequent 
elaboration of the Tavita dicta does more to reinforce the traditional 
attitude of the courts towards international instruments than it does to 
develop the law in this area.72 
As well as the personal attitude of some members of the judiciary 
towards international conventions, judicial acceptance of Tavita has 
also been affected by the type of right under consideration. Where the 
courts have had to consider social and economic rights as opposed to 
the rights of a child, they have not been as willing to consider the 
relevant international obligations, as the decision of Thorp J in Ankers 
v Attomey-Ge,wra[73 illustrates. This case involved a challenge to the 
Minister of Social Welfare's directions concerning the grant of special 
benefits under section 61G of the Social Security Act 1964, as well as the 
application of those directions by the Social Welfare Department. One 
of the grounds pleaded in the attack on the Minister of Social Welfare's 
directions was that the Minister had failed to take into account a 
relevant factor, namely New Zealand's obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
Thorp J, while accepting that Tavita emphasised the significance of 
international covenants to the interpretation and proper exercise of 
statutory powers to which those international covenants relate, 
distinguished this case on factual grounds. He held that unlike in 
Tavita where it was accepted that at no stage had the Minister 
concerned or his department taken international obligations into 
account, on the facts of this case there was no evidence for the 
contention that the Covenant obligations were not considered by the 
Minister. 74 The implication of this decision is that Tavita will be 
71 (supra n 50). 
72 note also that it was McGechan J who decided Federated Fnrmers v NZ Post where 
Ashby was followed. 
73 [1995] NZFLR 193. 
74 ibid., at 208-9. 
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followed depending on what type of right is under consideration. 
Although there is a strong link between the Social Security Act 1964 
and the Covenant which would point to the conclusion that the 
Covenant should be used to interpret the Act, it can be argued that as 
the scope of the rights in the Act depend on social policy decisions 
which in turn raise issues of government expenditure, the courts are 
less willing to enforce social and economic international obligations. Dr 
R Harrison has suggested that the Ankers decision and its weak 
response to the International Covenant on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights, reflects the preoccupation of the judiciary with civil 
and political rights. A possible explanation for this preoccupation with 
civil and political rights being that these rights are expressly recognised 
in the Bill of Rights Act and Human Rights Act and that New Zealand 
as a developed country has at least a measure of social welfare support 
for the needy, making the social and economic rights as set out in the 
International Covenant less significant.75 
A similar response to Tavita can be seen m the Planning Tribunal's 
decision St Columba's Environmental House Group v Hawkes Bay 
Region76, which concerned environmental international obligations as 
opposed to human rights obligations. The appellants in this case sought 
to have a number of provisions reinstated in the Hawkes Bay Regional 
Policy Statement, including an insertion of an acknowledgment of the 
principles derived from the Rio Declaration. On the question of 
whether the principles derived from the Rio Declaration should be 
included in the Regional Policy statement the Planning Tribunal cited 
Ashby and the House of Lords decision Brind, holding that the 
judiciary could not import an international convention into domestic 
law. The decision of Tavita was distinguished on the ground that the 
Rio Declaration concerned "amorphous environmental issues" rather 
than human rights issues.77 This decision again illustrates that the 
decision to follow Tavita depends on the type of rights under 
consideration. 
75 R Harrison, "Domestic Enforcement of International Human Rights in the Courts: 
Some Recent Developments" [1995] NZLJ 256 at 264. 
76 [1994] NZRMA 560. 
77 ibid., at 575. 
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Therefore, the response of the courts, particularly the Family Court, to 
Tavita show that some members of the judiciary support the change of 
approach towards international instruments and therefore support the 
legal culture giving international instruments greater status in 
domestic law. This change of approach only applies to international 
human rights instruments and of these instruments only those which 
contain civil and political human rights as opposed to social and 
economic human rights. 
2.4 Interpretation of Statutes 
This growing willingness of the courts to recognise international 
human rights instruments in domestic law can also be seen by 
examining the response of the courts when asked to interpret statutes 
which have a strong connection to an international instrument. By a 
strong connection it is meant that the statute mirrors the principles or 
rights of an international instrument and/ or there is a reference to the 
international instrument in the statute. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 stands out as the most 
obvious example of a statute that has strong connections to 
international human rights instruments. Not only does the Bill of 
Rights mirror the provisions of major international human rights 
instruments, it also affirms in its Long Title, New Zealand's 
commitment to the ICCPR. In the leading Bill of Rights case of Ministry 
of Transport v Noort78 , in which the Court of Appeal ruled evidence 
inadmissible, where obtained after violations of the Bill of Rights 
provisions, Cooke P stated:79 
In approaching the Bill of Rights if must be of cardinal importance to bear in 
mind the antecedents. The International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights speaks of inalienable rights derived from the inherent dignity of the 
human person. Internationally there is very general recognition that some 
human rights are fundamental and anterior to any municipal law, although 
78 [1992) 3 NZLR 260; (1992) 8 CRNZ 114, hereinafter Noort . 
79 ibid., at 270. 
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municipal law may fall short of giving effect to them. 
Despite this dicta of Cooke P in Noort, the initial response of the 
judiciary towards the ICCPR in interpreting the Bill of Rights was not 
very encouraging, as can be seen from the decisions on the meaning of 
"arbitrary" in section 22 of the Bill of Rights. Section 22 of the Bill of 
Rights was modelled on article 9(1) of the ICCPR, however in their 
early decisionsSO the courts failed to recognise this fact, ignoring the 
special meaning of "arbitrary" that the Human Rights Committee had 
determined in van Alphen v the Netherlands.81 It was not until the 
decision of Cooke P in R v Goodwin82, that reference was made to 
article 9(1) of the ICCPR in the interpretation of section 22. However, 
even in this decision not all the members of the Court of Appeal 
acknowledged the meaning that the Human Rights Committee had 
given to "arbitrary", which embraced the dual aspects of illegality and 
injustice, as Richardson J held that "arbitrary" does not turn on its 
illegality but on the nature and extent of any departure from the 
substantive and procedural standards involved. In R v Goodwin 
(No2)83 the Court of Appeal finally acknowledged article 9(1) of the 
ICCPR and the decision of the Human Rights Committee in van 
Alphen v the Netherlands in the interpretation of section 22, as the 
principle was laid down that in general unlawful detention will be 
arbitrary detention for the purposes of section 22 of the Bill of Rights. 
The more recent decisions of the courts show a willingness to observe 
international human rights instruments and accompanying 
jurisprudence in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. In Police v 
Smith84 Richardson J, in deciding the meaning of the word "detained" 
in section 23(1) of the Bill of Rights, referred to art 9(1) of the ICCPR 
which sets down the right to liberty and security of person. He 
examined contemporary international material on the explanation of 
art 9(1), including "The Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
80 see R v Edwards [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 37; Re M [1990-92] 1 NZBORR 217; Re S [1990-
92] 1 NZBORR 237. 
81 Comm No 305/1988, GOAR, 45th Sess, Supp No 40 (A/45/40). 
82 (1992) 9 CRNZ 1. 
83 [1993] 2 NZLR 390. 
84 [1994] 2 NZLR 306. 
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Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment" adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations (1988, 43/173) and the 
"Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention" (UN Doc 
E/CN /1992/ 20), coming to the conclusion that s 23(1) of the Bill of 
Rights was aimed at significant deprivations of liberty only.85 
International human rights instruments have also been referred to by 
the courts in three other very recent Bill of Rights decisions. In R v L86, 
a case which concerned the scope of the right to a fair trial and the right 
to cross-examine witnesses, the Court of Appeal referred to the terms of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the decisions 
upon it. The Court of Appeal held that it was justified in referring to 
the relevant provisions of the ECHR on the ground that they were 
parallel to the provisions in the Bill of Rights. The High Court also 
relied on international human rights jurisprudence, in determining 
the scope of the right to a fair trial in the later case R v B.87 In holding 
that the principle of "equality of arms" between the prosecution and 
defence was a well recognised and inherent aspect of the right to a fair 
trial, the Court was persuaded by the defence counsel's submissions 
which cited decisions and general comments of the Human Rights 
Committee that supported the "equality of arms" principle. In Martin v 
The District Court at Tauranga88 international human rights 
instruments were again referred to in the determination of a Bill of 
Rights issue. The issue before court was whether a delay of 17 months, 
between a criminal charge and the proposed trial date, breached the 
accused's right to be tried without undue delay under section 25(b) of 
the Bill of Rights. Even though the decision was ultimately decided by 
reference to Canadian authority, the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal both referred to the ICCPR and the ECHR in understanding the 
meaning of "undue delay" in the Bill of Rights. 
85 ibid., at 316. 
86 [1994) 1 HRNZ 310; [1994) 2 NZLR 55. 
87 [1994) 1 HRNZ 1. 
88 [1994) 1 HRNZ 186. 
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The Employment Contracts Act 1991 
Freedom of association is of central importance to the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991 (ECA), with the objects clause of the ECA stating that 
one of the subsidiary objects of the ECA is to "provide for freedom of 
association". Freedom of association has also been regarded as a 
fundamental human right in international human rights instruments 
including the ICCPR (article 22), the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (article 8) and in the 
International Conventions 87 and 88 promulgated by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO). This connection between the ECA and the 
various international instruments has encouraged the courts to refer to 
these international instruments when interpreting the ECA.89 
In Eketone v Alliance Textiles (NZ) Ltd90, Gault J used international 
instruments including the unratified ILO standards in interpreting the 
scope of freedom of association in the ECA. After affirming the 
principle in Noort, that it is appropriate to have reference to the terms 
of, and decisions upon, international instruments dealing with 
fundamental rights, when interpreting the scope of the rights under 
the Bill of Rights Act and other relevant legislation, Gault J stated 
that:91 
Freedom of association is, of course, much broader than the rights to join or not 
to join a trade union. However, in the present context that is what is in issue. 
Part 1 of the Employment Contracts Act is directed to these rights and is to be 
seen as legislative compliance with New Zealand's international 
commitments. It is not open to the Courts to depart from the plain meaning of 
the words of the statute but where it can be done ... the statute is to be given 
meaning consistent with freedom of association as internationally recognised. 
These sentiments were endorsed by the Full Employment Court in NZ 
Medical Laboratory Workers Union Inc v Capital Coast Health Ltd92 
where it stated that it was "inclined to be receptive in principle" to a 
submission that, as there is nothing in the ECA that is contrary to the 
principle of freedom of association, as set out in the main international 
89 For a general discussion of the use of international conventions in Employment Law 
see Gordon, A and Thompson, M eds Mnzengarb's Employment Law, (1995) Vol 1 at 
A/201 -A,212. 
90 [1993) 2 ERNZ 783, hereinafter Eketo11e. 
91 £ketone (supra n 90) at 795. 
92 [1994) 2 ERNZ 93. 
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instruments, then this shows that it was Parliament's intention to 
recognise these international instruments and standards and to invite 
the Courts to have regard to them.93 
Despite these positive endorsements of the use of international 
conventions in the interpretation of the ECA, Goddard CJ in Ivamy v 
New Zealand Fire Service Commission94 was of the opinion that he 
was not justified in having regard to unratified ILO Conventions 87 
and 98, for the purpose of interpreting the legislative intention of the 
ECA.95 He disagreed with Gault J's comments in Eketone that on the 
passing of the ECA the reasons for withholding ratification of the ILO 
Conventions 87 and 98 had evaporated, implying that they could now 
be used in the interpretation of the ECA. The effect of this decision is 
that it places in doubt the legitimacy of the use of the unratified ILO 
Conventions in the interpretation of the ECA. It does not however 
detract from the principle that international instruments that have 
been ratified can be used in the interpretation of the ECA. 
Therefore, where a statute has a strong connection to international 
human rights instruments the courts have shown that they are willing 
to refer to these instruments in the interpretation of the statute. The 
judicial use of international human rights instruments in the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights and the ECA illustrates this point. 
This willingness to refer to international human rights instruments is 
indicative of the changing legal culture surrounding these 
instruments. If the courts took a strict traditionalist approach towards 
the interpretation of these statutes, they would not refer to 
international instruments. The fact that international human rights 
instruments hold persuasive force in these judicial decisions shows the 
enhanced status these instruments now hold in domestic law. 
93 ibid., at 118. 
94 unreported, Employment Court, Wellington, 14 July 1995,WEC 44/95, Goddard CJ. 
95 ibid., at 52-3. 
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2.5 The Changing Legal Culture and Baigent 
The traditional approach of the courts towards international 
instruments is no longer being followed with such vigour in relation 
to international human rights instruments which set out civil and 
political rights. This change in approach is evidenced by the Court of 
Appeal's decision in Tavita and by the willingness of the courts to refer 
to international human rights instruments when interpreting statutes 
which either mirror provisions of the international instruments 
and/ or affirm an international instrument. This approach is indicative 
of an emerging legal culture surrounding international human rights 
which is recognising these instruments in domestic law. In Baigent the 
Court of Appeal goes further than just using the ICCPR to help 
interpret the scope of a right under the Bill of Rights, as in establishing 
a general remedial jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights, article 2(3) of 
the ICCPR was effectively imported into the Bill of Rights. This action 
is justified in that it can be seen to be consistent with the present legal 
culture surrounding international human rights instruments. Those 
who question the legitimacy of the decision on the ground that it 
conflicts with the traditional approach of the courts towards 
international instruments, must now consider Baigent within the 
context of this emerging legal culture. In Tavita, the Court of Appeal 
issued a warning to the Executive that they should consider New 
Zealand's international obligations when they are exercising their 
statutory discretions. Baigent can also be interpreted as a judicial 
warning but this time to Parliament. If Parliament is going to enact 
human rights legislation which affirms international instruments then 
the present legal culture demands that the courts take this as a sign that 
Parliament does not intend to disregard its international obligations. 
Therefore if the ICCPR states that remedies must be given for breaches 
of fundamental human rights then the courts, in accordance with the 
legal culture, should interpret this as allowing them to give remedies 
in domestic law for the breach of the Bill of Rights. 
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3. Other Common Law Courts and International Instruments 
3.1 Introduction 
The present legal culture in New Zealand which is giving international 
human rights instruments an increased status in domestic law cannot 
be viewed in isolation from the judicial decisions of other 
commonwealth countries. If it can be concluded that the legal culture 
surrounding international instruments in Australia, England and 
Canada is moving in the same way, then this will reinforce New 
Zealand's legal culture, making it more difficult to denounce. This in 
turn will make it harder to question the legitimacy of Baigent, which 
should be viewed in the context of the changing legal culture 
surrounding international human rights instruments. 
3.2 The Approach of the Australian Courts 
The decision of the High Court of Australia decided in April 1995, 
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh96 is the most 
recent decision to pronounce on the status of international human 
rights instruments in Australian domestic law. This decision shows a 
changing legal culture in Australia with respect to international 
human rights instruments. 
The facts in Teoh were very similar to those in Tavita, as the case 
involved immigration law and a deportation order. Mr Teoh, a 
Malaysian citizen, entered Australia in May 1988 on a temporary entry 
permit and then proceeded to marry an Australian citizen and father 
her four children. Three further children were born of the marriage. He 
applied for a grant of resident status however before the application 
was decided he was convicted for drug offences and sentenced to six 
years imprisonment. As a result of his conviction his application for 
resident status was denied by a delegate of the Minister for 
Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, and in February 
1992 after an unsuccessful appeal to the Immigration Review Panel, an 
96 (1995) 128 ALR 353, hereinafter Teoh. 
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order was made by another delegate of the Minister, that Teoh be 
deported. Teoh applied to the Federal Court for an order of review of 
the delegates' decisions. The application was dismissed by the trial 
judge however on appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court97 the 
appeal was allowed due to two factors. First, the Court held that the 
delegates had failed to give proper consideration to the effect that the 
deportation would have on Teoh's family. Second, Teoh's children had 
a legitimate expectation that their father's resident status would be 
treated in accordance with the terms of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which Australia had ratified on 17 
December 1990. The Minister appealed the decision to the High Court 
of Australia. 
The High Court of Australia dismissed the appeal (Mason CJ, Deane, 
Toohey and Gaudron JJ, McHugh J dissenting). The majority held 
(Mason CJ, Deane and Toohey JJ) that although the provisions of an 
international treaty to which Australia is a party do not form part of 
Australian law unless they have been incorporated into domestic law 
by statute, the ratification of the Convention does give rise to a 
legitimate expectation that administrative decision-makers would act 
in conformity with the Convention and treat the best interests of the 
child as a primary consideration. Mason CJ and Deane J stated in their 
joint judgment:98 
Ratification of a convention is a positive statement by the Executive 
Government of this country to the world and to the Australian people that the 
Executive Government and its agencies will act in accordance with the 
Convention. That positive statement is an adequate foundation for a legitimate 
expectation, absent statutory or executive indications to the contrary, that 
administrative decision-makers will act in conformity with the Convention 
and treat the best interests of the children as 'a primary consideration'. It is not 
necessary that a person seeking to set up such a legitimate expectation should 
be aware of the Convention or should personally entertain the expectation; it is 
enough that the expectation is reasonable in the sense that there are adequate 
materials to support it. 
The court further held that the existence of a legitimate expectation, 
that a delegate would act in conformity with the Convention, did not 
compel the delegate to act in that way as this was the difference between 
97 (1994) 121 ALR 436. 
98 Teoh (supra n 96) at 365. 
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a legitimate expectation and a binding rule of law. But if the delegate 
proposed to make a decision which did not accord with the principle 
that the best interests of the children were the primary consideration, 
procedural fairness required the delegate to give the children notice 
and an opportunity to respond.99 
McHugh J wrote a powerful dissent to the majority decision arguing 
that no legitimate expectation arose in this case. His first argument was 
based on the principle of law upheld by the High Court of Australia in 
Attorney-General (NSW) v QuinlOO, that the concept of legitimate 
expectation is concerned with procedural fairness and imposes no 
obligation on a decision-maker to give substantive protection to any 
right, benefit, privilege or matter that is this subject of a legitimate 
expectation. He argued that as the legitimate expectation upheld by the 
majority would oblige the decision-maker to comply with the 
Convention, this amounted to an expectation for substantive not 
procedural protection therefore no legitimate expectation existed.101 
Clearly on this point the majority judges and McHugh J disagree. The 
judges in the majority claimed that they were giving procedural not 
substantive protection to the expectation, in that the decision-maker 
was not compelled to apply the Convention. Whether or not the 
legitimate expectation in this case demands substantive as opposed to 
procedural protection, the principle of law that McHugh J sets out as 
the basis of this argument is not settled. 
In the High Court of Australia there appears to be two lines of 
argument concerning the concept of legitimate expectation. Brennan J 
stresses that the judiciary can only give procedural protection to a 
legitimate expectation and rejects the theory of judicial review which 
would give substantive protection to an individual's expectation.102 
Brennan J emphasised this view in Quinl03 reiterating it in Annetts v 
99 ibid., at 365. 
100 (1990) 170 CLR 1, hereinafter Quin. 
101 Teoh (supra n 96) at 382. 
102 see Forsyth "The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations" (1988) 47 
Cambridge Law Journal 238. 
103 Quin (supra n 100) at 34-40. 
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McCannl04. Mason CJ, in contrast to Brennan J, states in Quin that in 
some circumstances where no harm will be done to the public interest, 
the court may extend substantive protection to a legitimate 
expectation.105 This view is endorsed in Annetts v McCann, where 
Mason CJ held that as the appellants had been granted representations 
at a coronial inquiry this created a legitimate expectation that the 
Coroner would not make any finding adverse to their interests without 
first giving them the opportunity to be heard.106 This use of the concept 
of legitimate expectations was rejected by Brennan J, as he interpreted it 
as giving an individual's expectation substantive protection as opposed 
to mere procedural protection.107 Although the High Court of 
Australia are having difficulty with the concept of legitimate 
expectation, the lower courts in Australia seem to support Brennan J's 
interpretation of the scope of protection afforded by the concept. In 
Tasmanian Conservation Trust Inc v Minister for Resources108, 
Sackville J in the Federal Court of Australia agreed with Brennan J 
comments in Quin. It was held that a legitimate expectation, arising 
from a representation of the decision-maker, that an adverse decision 
will not be made without first giving a person who has the expectation 
an opportunity to be heard, cannot prevent the decision-maker from 
exercising a statutory power or discretion in the public interest.109 This 
finding implies that the courts will only protect expectations of a 
procedural nature not those which will give substantive protection to a 
person's expect a tion.11 o 
The New Zealand courts are also having difficulty determining the 
scope of protection that they can give to a person's legitimate 
expectation. In Northern Roller Milling Co Ltd v Commerce 
Commissionlll Gallen J stated that the concept of fairness need not be 
104 (1990) 97 ALR 177. 
105 Quin (supra n 100) at 23. 
106 Annetts v McCann (supra n 104) at 179. 
107 ibid., at 183-185. 
108 (1995) 127 ALR 580. 
109 ibid., at 610-611. 
110 see also Waters v Acting Administrator (1995) 119 ALR 557 at 574-575; Minister for 
Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs v Hamsher (1992) 26 ALD 406 at 
407-408;D11rnnt v Greiner (1990) 21 NSWLR at 130. 
111 [1994) 2 NZLR 747. 
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confined to merely procedural matters. He refers to Mason CJ's 
comments in Quin, that the court may in some circumstances give 
substantive protection to a legitimate expectation and further states:112 
It is not extending the reasoning of Mason CJ in the Quin case very far to suggest 
that where the circumstances are such that in a dispute between individuals, 
the behaviour of one would lead to a particular outcome, the same approach 
should lead to a similar result in an administrative situation unless the nature 
of the decision is such that its maker should not be fettered in this way. 
In two more recent High Court decisions, the reasoning of Brennan J in 
Quin was supported, the concept of legitimate expectation being limited 
to procedural protection. Ngai Tahu Maori Trust Board v Director-
General of Conservationl 13 concerned an application for judicial 
review of the proposed exercise of the statutory power, of the Director-
General of Conservation, to grant permits for commercial whale-
watching. One of the pleaded grounds of review was that the applicants 
as existing permit holders had a legitimate expectation that no further 
permits for whale watching would be granted until the third and 
fourth applicants had had sufficient time to repay the capital 
development costs involved in the establishment of their whale-
watching enterprises. Neazor J rejected this submission upholding 
Brennan J statement in Quin, that the concept of legitimate expectation 
relates to the process to be followed in the making of a decision not to a 
substantive outcome. He held that the applicants claim could not 
succeed on this ground in so far as it was directed to the substantive 
determination to be made on permit applications.I 14 In Taiaroa v 
Minister of Justice, McGechan J in addressing an issue relating to the 
applicants' legitimate expectations also cited Quin and held that the 
term legitimate expectation is "an expectation as to process, borne out 
of governmental statement or well established governmental practice, 
from which a departure without notice would be unfair."115 
This obvious disparity in the High Court concernmg the scope of 
protection that a legitimate expectation demands will need to be settled 
by the Court of Appeal in a future case. The 1994 decision of the Court 
112 ibid., at 754. 
113 unreported, High Court, Wellington, 23 December 1994, CP841/92, Neazor J. 
114 ibid., at 35-36. 
115 Taiaroa (supra n 69) at 36. 
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of Appeal Thames Valley EPB v NZFP Pulp & Paper Ltdll6, signals the 
approach that the Court of Appeal may take on such an issue. In this 
case "substantive fairness" was upheld as a legitimate ground of 
judicial review, which shows that the Court of Appeal is expanding the 
scope of judicial review to cover the quality of administrative decisions 
as well as the procedure.117 With the Court of Appeal being responsive 
to this ground of review, this may mean that they will be more open to 
the argument that the concept of legitimate expectation should give 
substantive protection to a person's interests not limiting the 
protection to procedural fairness. 
Considering the uncertainty surrounding the concept of legitimate 
expectation both in the Australian and New Zealand courts, the first 
argument of McHugh J in Teoh is questionable. There is a definite line 
of argument which has been given some support in the courts, that the 
concept of legitimate expectation can in some circumstances give 
substantive protection to a person's legitimate interests of a favourable 
decision. This line of argument supports the majority decision in Teoh 
and weakens McHugh J's first argument. 
Another argument that McHugh J put forward of why no legitimate 
expectation arose in this case was that the ratification of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child does not give rise to any 
legitimate expectation.118 In support of this argument he asserted that, 
Conventions were agreements between States and by ratification the 
Executive Government does not give undertakings to its citizens. He 
goes on to make the practical point that if by ratifying a convention a 
legitimate expectation arises this would have the effect of altering the 
duties of all State government officials, as all ratified conventions 
would apply to every decision made by a federal official unless the 
official stated that he or she would not comply with the convention. 
The consequences for administrative decision-making were held to be 
enormous considering that Australia is party to over 900 treaties.119 
116 (1994] 2 NZLR 641. 
117 ibid., at 652. 
118 Teoh (supra n 96) at 385. 
119 ibid., at 385. 
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This argument fails to draw any distinction between the different types 
of rights contained in treaties. When Mason CJ and Deane J held that 
ratification of a convention gives rise to a legitimate expectation, they 
were not referring to all conventions but only ones which declare 
universal fundamental human rights.120 The legitimacy of this 
distinction can be upheld by emphasising two features of international 
human rights treaties which distinguish them from the more classical 
international conventional law. Classical international conventional 
law is concerned with stabilising and facilitating interstate relations, 
whereas international human rights conventions are strikingly 
different in that they stipulate that obligations are owed directly to 
individuals. International human rights conventions can also be 
distinguished from the more classical international law conventions in 
that human rights are universal, as they are held by virtue of being a 
human person, it being irrelevant what state that person lives in.121 
The subject matter of most international conventions do not have lhis 
universal quality and so can be distinguished from international 
human rights conventions. McHugh J in failing to recognise this 
distinction exaggerates the consequences of the majority decision in 
Teoh and so his argument on this point is also weakened. 
The majority decision of the High Court of Australia in Teoh is truly 
significant. The effect of holding that people have a legitimate 
expectation that a decision-maker will act in accordance with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, is that decision-makers will 
have to consider this Convention in making decisions concerning 
children. Although the High Court of Australia stresses that 
international instruments are not to have effect in domestic law until 
implemented by statute, its decision taken to its logical conclusion 
amounts to a judicial importation into domestic law of international 
instruments. This decision then is a major cause for concern for those 
like McHugh J, who support the notion of national sovereignty and the 
120 ibid., at 362. 
121 There is an argument that human rights are not universal considering the diverse 
cultures and political systems of the world. See, R. Higgins Problems & Process -
International law and how We Use It (1994), 96-97, where she argues that human rights 
are universal; D Donoho, 'Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The 
Search for Meaningful Standards' (1991) 27 Stanford Law Journal 345. 
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supremacy of Parliament, with international instruments having no 
effect on the domestic law whatsoever. One may ask McHugh J and 
others who oppose the decision, why does the Executive bothers to 
ratify international instruments if they are to have no effect in 
domestic law? 
A political backlash to the majority decision in Teoh, which supports 
the dissenting arguments of McHugh J, looks likely to quash any 
enduring effect that the decision may have. On the 10 May 1995 in a 
joint-statement released by the Foreign Affairs Minister Senator Gareth 
Evans and the Attorney General Michael Lavarch it was made very 
clear that the Federal Parliament did not support the majority decision 
in Teoh. They stated:122 
It is not legitimate, for the purposes of applying Australian law, to expect 
that the provisions of a treaty not incorporated by legislation should be 
applied by decision-makers. 
Legislation is to be introduced into the Federal Parliament to reinforce 
this statement, with the effect of putting beyond any doubt the status of 
unincorporated international obligations. 
Despite this political backlash to the Teoh decision, it is still significant 
in that it shows the current revolutionary attitude of the High Court of 
Australia towards international human rights instruments and human 
rights law generally. The majority judges show that they are anxious to 
protect human rights and are forcing the Australian Federal Parliament 
to face up to its international human rights obligations, which it 
refuses to legislate for domestically. What the political backlash signals 
to the High Court of Australia is that they will have to resort to less 
controversial ways of giving effect to international human rights in 
domestic law. Gaudron J hinted at one such way in Teoh by suggesting 
an argument that would see the common law developed so that 
human rights, as expressed in ratified conventions, are given 
recognition. She argued in Teoh that citizenship carries with it a 
common law right, on the part of children and their parents, to have a 
child's best interests taken into account, at least as a primary 
122 Michael Dwyer, "Australia: Govt Clips the Role of Unlegislated Treaties", 
Australian Financial Review, 11 May 1995. 
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consideration, m all discretionary administrative decisions which 
directly affect children. The significance of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child to this argument, was that it gave expression to a 
fundamental human rights taken for granted in Australian society.123 
These obiter comments are reinforced by Brennan J in Mabo v 
Queensland (No 2)124 who argues that international human rights 
instruments can be used to develop the common law. He states:125 
The opening up of international remedies to individuals pursuant to Australia's 
accession to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights brings to bear on the common law the powerful influence of the 
Covenant and the international standards that it imports. The common law 
does not necessarily conform with international law, but international law is a 
legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law, 
especially where international law declares the existence of universal human 
rights. 
This approach although not endorsed by the other members of the 
High Court of Australia in Mabo, was accepted by the High Court of 
Australia in Teoh126. The High Court of Australia did warn though 
that a cautious approach must be taken by the courts in developing the 
common law in this way, as the development must not be seen as a 
"backdoor means of importing an unincorporated convention into 
Australian law" .127 
Therefore, the current approach of the High Court of Australia towards 
international human rights instruments is indicative of a legal culture 
which is giving increased recognition to these instruments. The 
decision goes further than Tavita as it effectively states, through the 
reference to the concept of legitimate expectations, that international 
convention are mandatory relevant considerations in decisions 
affecting a person's human rights. The political backlash to this 
decision will effect this revolutionary attitude towards international 
human rights instruments, though it will not alter the fact that the 
current legal culture surrounding international human rights 
instruments in Australia is changing. 
123 Teoh (supra n 96) at 375-6. 
124 (1992)175 CLR 1, hereinafter Mabo. 
125 ibid., at 42. 
126 Teoh (supra n 96) at 384(McHugh J), 362(Mason CJ, Deane J). 
127 ibid., at 362. 
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3.3 The Approach of the English Courts 
The international human rights instrument which the English courts 
have given most of their attention to to date, is a regionally based 
Convention, the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which England ratified in 
1953. Even though England, like Australia and New Zealand, has 
ratified the ICCPR, the ECHR has a higher profile because since 1966 
England has recognised the right of an individual to send a petition to 
the European Commission of Human Rights claiming a breach of the 
Convention and if the Commission finds such a breach and it cannot 
be settled in a friendly manner, have the case determined by the 
European Court of Human Rights. Having this form of individual 
redress for its citizens has meant that England has not been pressed to 
ratify the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which allows 
individuals to send communications to the United Nation's Human 
Rights Committee.128 
The effect on the English domestic law of article 10, the freedom of 
expression provision in the ECHR, was considered by the House of 
Lords in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte 
Brind and Others.129 The issue before the court was whether the 
Secretary of State was obliged to consider the ECHR when issuing 
directives under s 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1981. The appellants 
submitted that when a statute confers upon an administrative 
authority a discretion capable of being exercised in a way which 
infringes any basic human right protected by the ECHR, it may be 
presumed that the legislative intention was that the discretion should 
be exercised within the limitations that the ECHR imposes. The House 
of Lords rejected this submission, holding that while the ECHR may be 
resorted to in order to resolve ambiguity or uncertainty in the wording 
of s 29(3) of the Broadcasting Act 1981, there was no uncertainty in the 
128 For a general commentary on the ECHR and Human Rights issues in Europe see R 
Beddard, Human Rights and Europe (3rd ed 1993). 
129 (supra n 48). 
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wording of the section and no presumption that the Secretary of State's 
discretion had to be exercised in accordance with the ECHR. To hold 
that the Secretary was obliged to consider the ECHR before issuing the 
directives would, in the House of Lord's opinion, amount to 
incorporation of the ECHR into English law by the back-door, 
amounting to a judicial usurpation of the legislative function.130 
Brind reinforces the traditional approach of the English courts towards 
international instruments and their effect on the domestic law. The 
more recent decision of the English Court of Appeal, Derbyshire 
County Council v Times Newspapers Ltdl31 shows however that not 
all English judges have such a traditionalist attitude towards 
international instruments. The facts in the Derbyshire are quite simple. 
In September 1988 two articles in the Sunday Times criticised share 
deals involving the Derbyshire County Council's superannuation fund. 
The Council and its leader brought actions against the paper for 
defamation. These actions were stayed pending an appeal to the Court 
of Appeal on the question of whether a local authority can sue for libel. 
In attempting to resolve this issue the Court of Appeal found that there 
was no clear authority in the English law for it to follow. The Court 
therefore turned to the article 10 of the ECHR to resolve the issue, 
holding that where the common law is ambiguous or unclear the court 
must have regard to the principles stated in the Convention.132 The 
Court of Appeal went on to decide that the Council could not sue in 
libel, the reason being that article 10 of the ECHR upheld "everyones 
right to freedom of expression" .133 
The Council appealed to the House of Lordsl34 and although the 
decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld, Lord Keith engaged 
different reasoning, avoiding the issue of whether Courts can refer to 
the ECHR when the common law is unclear. In referring to the 
130 ibid., at 478(Lord Bridge). 
131 [1992] 3 WLR 28, hereinafter Derbyshire. 
132 Butler-Sloss LJ and Ralph Gibson LJ both hold that the courts "must" take into 
consideration the ECHR, with Balcombe LJ holding that it is "permissible" for the 
courts to do so. 
133 Derbyshire (supra n 131) at 45(Balcornbe LJ), 63(Butler-S1oss LJ). 
134 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1993] 2 WLR 449. 
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reasoning of the Court of Appeal, Lord Keith does not expressly dismiss 
it. Instead he rules out the need to refer to the ECHR in this case as, 
following the decision of Lord Goff in Attorney General v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd. (No.2)135, the English common law is no different in 
principle from article 10 of the ECHR. 
By relying on the ECHR to clarify an area of the common law, the Court 
of Appeal extended the rule considerably as to the circumstances in 
which the ECHR may be used in the domestic courts. The House of 
Lords, by refusing to address the issue of whether the ECHR can be used 
by the Courts to resolve ambiguities in the common law, has confused 
rather than clarified the Court of Appeal's decision. Did the House of 
Lords impliedly reject the Court of Appeal's reasoning by refusing to 
comment on it? Or did the House of Lord's silence mean that the Court 
of Appeal's approach would be acceptable in other cases where the 
common law is obviously unclear? Further, did the House of Lords 
simply leave the issue open, neither accepting or rejecting the Court of 
Appeal's approach rather preferring to decide the issue in a future case? 
This last interpretation seems to be the most logical considering that 
the House of Lords saw the ECHR as irrelevant to the issue. Therefore, 
even though the law is somewhat confused on whether the ECHR can 
be used to develop the common law, Derbyshire shows that the English 
courts are finally beginning to take notice of the principles of the ECHR 
and to give them effect in domestic law. R Higgins identifies the 
English Court of Appeal's decision in Derbyshire, as indicative of a 
changing legal culture in which international human rights law is felt 
to be part of English public life. This legal culture encouraged the Court 
of Appeal to use this law in the development of the common law, 
notwithstanding the fact that it has not been incorporated by legislation 
into the domestic law.136 
135 [1990] 1 AC 109 at 283-284. 
136 R Higgins, "Problems and Process- International Law and How We Use It" (1994) 
216. 
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3.4 The Approach of the Canadian Courts 
The approach of the Canadian courts towards international treaties and 
conventions has been extremely cautious. Although they accept the 
presumption that Parliament and the Legislatures do not intend to 
legislate in violation of Canada's international obligations, they have 
refused to refer to these international obligations to interpret domestic 
statutes unless an ambiguity appears on the face of the statute. This 
point was made clear by Laskin J in Capital Cities Communications Inc. 
v Canadian Radio-Television137, where he held that he would not 
consider the Inter-American Radio Communications Convention 1937 
in interpreting the Broadcasting Act, which did not implement the 
Convention, because he could not find any ambiguity in the Act. 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which was enacted in 
1982, signalled to the courts that a change of approach to international 
human rights instruments was needed if the Charter was to be 
interpreted correctly. This was because even though the Charter did not 
expressly implement any of the international human rights 
instruments that Canada subscribes to, they were extremely influential 
in the drafting of the Charter, with many of the provisions in the 
Charter reflecting their language and ideology .138 It was hoped because 
of this strong link between the municipal and international 
conventional law, that the Charter's application would lead to a 
"multi-national-transcultural-international approach to patterns of 
interpretation".139 The approach of the Canadian courts is of particular 
interest to the New Zealand courts in the way that they interpret the 
Bill of Rights, considering that both pieces of legislation affirm 
fundamental human rights and both relied heavily on international 
human rights instruments in their drafting. 
The enactment of the Charter has seen a dramatic change in the 
approach of the Canadian courts towards international instruments, 
137 (1978), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 609 (SCC). 
138 M Cohen & A F Bayefsky, "Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Public 
International Law" (1983) 61 CBR 263 at 267. 
139 ibid ., at 310. 
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causing an exponential growth in the number of cases which refer to 
these instruments.140 Dickson CJC of the Supreme Court of Canada has 
been extremely influential in this change of approach. In his dissenting 
judgment in Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act 
(Alta)141, a case which concerned the nature and scope of the right of 
freedom of association of workers, Dickson CJC examined international 
treaties and conventions stating:142 
The various sources of international human rights law- declarations, covenant
s, 
conventions, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of international tribunals, 
customary norms- must, in my opinion, be relevant and persuasive sources 
for interpretation of the Charter's provisions. 
As well as stressing the importance of referring to international human 
rights instruments to determine the nature and scope of Charter 
provisions, Dickson CJC also held in Slaight Communications Inc. v 
Davidson143, that these instruments could be used in the interpretation 
of section 1 of the Charter, to determine what constitutes a pressing and 
substantial objective justifying restrictions upon Charter rights. He also 
made an obiter statement, that international law should be used to 
ensure that the Charter provides protection as great as that afforded by 
Canada's international legal obligations. In R v Keegstra144 Dickson CJC 
again referred to international human rights instruments in Charter 
litigation, the issue raised was whether section 319 (2) of the Criminal 
Code, which made it an offence to wilfully promote hate propaganda 
against an identifiable group, violated the Charter guarantee of 
freedom of expression. Dickson CJC writing in the majority, referred to 
Canada's international obligations in order to determine the legislative 
objective behind this section of the Code. In looking at the CERD and 
the ICCPR he found that freedom of expression did not extend to cover 
hate propaganda and as such held that the objective of section 319(2) of 
the Code must also be to prohibit hate propaganda, justifying a limit on 
freedom of expression.145 
140 A F Bayefsky, International Human Rights Law - Use in Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms Litigation (1992) at 73. 
141 [1987] 1 SCR 313. 
142 ibid., at 348. 
143 [1989] 1 SCR 1038. 
144 (1990), 1 C.R.(4th) 129, hereinafter Keegstra. 
145 ibid., at 42. 
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Despite these findings of Dickson CJC, which show a change in 
approach of the Canadian judiciary towards international instruments, 
his views do not have universal support. The dissent of McLachlin J in 
Keegstra, illustrates this point. Although recognising the usefulness of 
Canada's international obligations in placing Charter interpretation in 
a larger context, she rejects that these obligations should be 
determinative of or used to limit the scope of Charter guarantees. This 
is because she sees the provisions of the Charter as uniquely Canadian 
even though they draw on the political and social philosophy shared 
with other democratic societies.146 The approach of Dickson CJC has 
also been criticised because of his failure to justify his use of 
international human rights instruments in Charter litigation.147 This 
failure to justify has led to the absence of a principled use of 
international instruments by the Canadian courts in Charter litigation, 
causing international human rights law arguments to be ignored in 
cases where they had the potential to be very powerful and decisive.148 
Considering this criticism of the use of international human rights 
instruments in the interpretation of the Charter, the question arises of 
whether this affects the legitimacy of the use of international human 
rights instruments by the New Zealand courts when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights. It can be argued that there are three distinguishing 
features between the Canadian Charter and the Bill of Rights, which 
support the New Zealand courts in adopting a different approach 
towards international instruments in the interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights. First, unlike the Charter, the Bill of Rights has an express 
reference to an international human rights instrument, the ICCPR, in 
its Long Title. The effect of this is that the New Zealand courts have a 
stronger justification for referring to the ICCPR than the Canadian 
courts. Second, Canada has a federal system of government which has 
traditionally made the judiciary more cautious with respect to 
146 ibid., at 104. 
147 A F Bayefsky,International Human Rights Law, Use in Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms Litigation,(1992) at 93. 
148 see Andrews v Law Society (B.C.) [1989] 1 SCR 143; Reference Re Workers 
Compensation Act , 1983 (Newfoundland), ss 32 & 34 [1989]1 SCR 922; R v Turpin [1988] 
1 SCR 1296. 
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international instruments.149 New Zealand is not a federal state so 
its 
judiciary does not have this tradition of caution towards internatio
nal 
instruments. Third, it can also be argued that the Canadian courts ha
ve 
not been so pressed to refer to international instruments in th
eir 
interpretation of the Charter because they have wide powers under 
the 
Charter which includes the ability to grant remedies for breaches
 of 
Charter rights. The Bill of Rights does not expressly state that the cou
rts 
may give remedies and so the courts have been forced to refer
 to 
international instruments in determining whether Parliament, 
in 
enacting the Bill of Rights, intended that the courts have the power
 to 
give remedies for breaches of the affirmed rights. Therefore aware
 of 
these distinguishing features between Canadian and New Zealand la
w, 
the fact that all members of the Canadian judiciary have n
ot 
universally supported the use of international instruments in 
the 
interpretation of the Charter, does not mean that the New Zeala
nd 
courts should adopt a similar stance towards such instruments 
in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
3.5 Conclusion 
From an examination of the approach of the judiciary of oth
er 
common law legal systems towards international human rig
hts 
instruments it can be concluded that the emerging legal culture in N
ew 
Zealand surrounding international human rights instruments, is a
lso 
emerging in Australia, England and to a more limited extent 
in 
Canada. With other common law judges part of and supportive of t
his 
emerging legal culture, the attitudes and approach of the New Zeala
nd 
judiciary is reinforced. Baigent to the extent that it is part of this 
emerging legal culture, is also reinforced. It can be argued that give
n 
the High Court of Australia decision in Teoh, this court would 
be 
supportive of the Court of Appeal's use of the ICCPR in Baigent in 
granting themselves a remedial jurisdiction under the Bill of Righ
ts. 
This support strengthens the legitimacy of the decision, as it is mo
re 
difficult to denounce a decision if it has an international legal cultu
re 
which supports it. 
149 see Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney-Genera/ for Ontario [1937] AC 326. 
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4. Factors Influencing this Change in Legal Culture 
4.1 Introduction 
Having established that there exists a legal culture which is supporting 
a change in the status of international human rights instruments in 
domestic law, the next question to be addressed is what are the factors 
influencing this change in legal culture? In exposing the factors which 
are influencing this legal culture we are able to understand why the 
courts are changing their approach towards international human rights 
instruments in domestic law . 
4.2. The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
The First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the jurisdiction of the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee is one important factor 
which is influencing the change in legal culture surrounding 
international human rights instruments and their status in domestic 
law. Under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which New 
Zealand ratified on 26 May 1989, New Zealand citizens can send written 
communications to the United Nations Human Rights Committee in 
New York claiming that their human rights under the ICCPR have 
been violated by the State. The individual must have exhausted all 
domestic remedies before sending a communication to the Committee 
and the Committee having ruled the communication admissible can 
order that the State provide a remedy if they form the view that a 
violation of the individual's human rights has taken place.150 This 
ability of individuals to take their human rights grievances to the 
Human Rights Committee for determination was an important factor 
in why the Court of Appeal asserted in Baigent that it had a remedial 
jurisdiction under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. Hardie 
150 NZ citizens are exercising their rights under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. In 
December 1992, a communication was filed with the Human Rights Committee by 
Apirana Mahuika & Others against the NZ Government. This communication alleges 
that the authors' rights under the ICCPR were violated by the 1992 "Sealords" Fishing 
Settlement. The Committee has not made a decision on the matter yet. 
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Boys J stated in Baigent that:151 
citizens of New Zealand ought not to have to resort to international tribunals to 
obtain adequate remedies for the infringement of Covenant rights this country 
has affirmed by statute. 
Casey J agreed with this argument, recognising that it was better for 
New Zealand citizens to gain remedies in their own courts for breaches 
of human rights, rather than having to go to New York to the Human 
Rights Committee for relief.152 
This argument is by no means exclusive to Baigent, as similar 
arguments have arisen in other cases involving international human 
rights instruments. In Tavita, Cooke P was influenced in his decision 
by the fact that New Zealand had acceded to the Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR. He stated that now that individuals have direct recourse to 
the Human Rights Committee this means that the courts must give 
practical effect to international human rights instruments otherwise 
they will face legitimate criticism.153 In response to the ratification by 
the Australian Federal Government of the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR, the Australian judiciary have expressed similar arguments. 
Brennan J in Mabo, in asserting that international human rights 
instruments could be used in the development of the common law, 
was influenced by the fact that individuals can now go to the Human 
Rights Committee and obtain remedies for the breach of their 
internationally recognised human rights.154 In an extra-curial paper 
Kirby J, the President of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, concurs 
with Brennan J as he asserts that:155 
Using principles of human rights which have become part of international law 
to fill the gaps of the common law and to aid the interpretation of ambiguous 
legislation involves no heretical leap into the unknown. It is, in a sense, the 
inevitable consequence of submitting our legal system to the scrutiny of the 
agencies of the international community, such as the Human Rights 
Committee established under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
The courts feel obliged to give effect to international human rights 
151 Baigent (supra n 2) at 699;83. 
152 ibid., at 691;73-4. 
153 Tavita (supra n 37) at 266. 
154 Mabo (supra n 124) at 42. 
155 M Kirby, "Human Rights- Emerging International Minimum Standards" (1993) 19(3) 
CLB 1252 at 1270. 
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instruments in domestic law because of the Human Rights 
Committee's remedial powers under the Optional Protocol. It needs to 
be asked therefore, whether the Human Rights Committee is a valid 
influence on whether the courts should be giving increased recognition 
to international human rights instruments in domestic law? The 
primary question to be determined is whether the Committee really 
does provide individuals with a meaningful avenue of redress for the 
violation of their human rights? If it is found that it does not, then it 
would seem that the judiciary is worrying unnecessarily about the 
powers of the Committee, causing their argument that they must 
develop the law of international human rights because of the Human 
Rights Committee's power to order remedies, to collapse. 
From its seventh session, in 1979, to its fifty-first session, in July 1994, 
the Human Rights Committee has adopted 193 views on 
communications received under article 5, paragraph 4 of the Optional 
Protocol, with the Committee finding violations of the ICCPR in 142 of 
the communications.156 The Committee has demonstrated that on the 
finding of a violation of an individual's human rights it will not 
hesitate in expressing a view that the State party involved should 
provide an effective remedy to the individual concerned. Two 
examples of communications where the Committee has ruled that a 
State party is under an obligation to pay compensation to an individual 
as a remedy for the violation of their human rights are Daniel 
Monguya Mbenge v Zaire157 and Antonio Viana Acosta v Uruguay.158 
In Mbenge the Committee formed the view that because Daniel 
Monguya Mbenge had been sentenced to death twice, contrary to the 
provisions of the ICCPR and had been charged, tried and convicted in 
circumstances in which he could not effectively enjoy the safeguards of 
due process enshrined in the provisions of the ICCPR, his rights had 
been violated and that the State of Zaire was under an obligation to pay 
compensation for the violations suffered. In Acosta the Committee 
156 General Assembly Official Records 49th Session,No. 40 (A/ 49 / 40) at 84. 
157 Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee, Vo! 2 at 76, hereinafter 
Mbenge. 
158 Selected Decision of the Human Rights Committee, Vol 2 at 148, hereinafter 
Acosta. 
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again formed the view that the State involved was under an obligation 
to pay compensation for violating one of its citizen's rights. In this 
communication the Committee found that the State of Uruguay had 
subjected the author of the communication to inhuman treatment 
while in detention, denied him counsel of his own choosing when he 
went before the Supreme Military Tribunal and was not tried without 
undue delay, all of which constituted State actions which violated 
certain provisions of the ICCPR. 
These two examples show that the Human Rights Committee is not 
afraid to come to a view that State parties must pay compensation for 
the violation of the rights of individuals. These view are weakened 
though, by the fact that they are not considered to be legally binding on 
the State party involved. It can be concluded that these views are not 
legally binding because the Optional Protocol does not contain a 
provision which stipulates that the Committee's views are binding and 
also because the Committee itself is not a judicial body, its main role 
being that of a supervisor over the human rights records of State 
parties.159 This non-binding nature of the Committee's views is further 
emphasised by comparing them to the decisions of the European Court 
of Human Rights and the European Commission set up under the 
ECHR. Article 53 of the ECHR stipulates that parties to the ECHR, who 
recognise the jurisdiction of the Court, "undertake to abide by the 
decision of the Court in any case to which they are parties". Likewise if 
a State party has violated the ECHR and the European Commission has 
proposed a friendly settlement to remedy the breach which is ignored, 
the matter will be referred to the Committee of Ministers who, under 
article 32 of the ECHR, have the power to affirm the violation and 
decide on an appropriate remedy for the breach. The decisions of the 
Committee, as provided in article 32( 4) of the ECHR, are regarded by the 
State party as 'binding' on them. 
Therefore as the Human Rights Committee's views are not binding in 
the same way as the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
and the Committee of Ministers are, the Committee has to apply non-
159 see Part IV ICCPR. 
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legal pressure to ensure that its views are carried out by the State Party 
involved. The Committee at its thirty-ninth session (July 1990), set up a 
procedure which allows it to monitor the follow-up to its views and 
established the mandate of a Special Rapporteur to help in the follow-
up of its views.160 The primary task of the Special Rapporteur is to 
request follow-up information from States parties who have been 
found by the Committee to have violated the ICCPR and then report 
back to the Committee with this information. The first four years of 
using the follow-up procedures have not been found by the Committee 
to be fully satisfactory.161 To combat this, the Committee has adopted 
the principle of publicity with respect to its follow-up procedures.162 
The Committee hopes that by making the results of its follow-up 
procedures publicly available this will enhance the authority of the 
Committee's views and encourage State parties to implement them. A 
further way in which the Committee is able to follow up on its views is 
through the State reporting system, set up under Part IV of the ICCPR. 
This system requires States to submit a report within a year of the 
Covenant entering into effect for them, and then to submit further 
reports on a five-year cycle.163 The Committee has made it a standard 
practice as part of this reporting system to ask State parties to clarify, 
during the considerations of their reports, how they are implementing 
views on communications adopted by the Committee.164 
This strengthening of the Committee's follow-up procedures must 
ensure that its views gain more prominence, making it harder for a 
State party who has violated the ICCPR to ignore them. A recent 
example of an Australian communication, further shows that the 
Human Rights Committee can have a real influence on ensuring that 
an individual can obtain a remedy for breaches of their human rights. 
160 This mandate is set out in annex XI of the Report of the Committee to the General 
Assembly at its Forty-seventh session (March/ April 1993). 
161 General Assembly Official records 49th Session No. 40 (A/ 49 / 40) at 85. 
162 This principle of publicity was agreed upon at the Committee's Forty-seventh 
session (March/ April 1993) and at its Fiftieth session (March 1994) the Committee 
adopted a new rule of procedure reinforcing this principle of publicity. 
163 R Higgins (supra n 30) at 108. 
164 RA Myullerson, "Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights 
Standards Experience of the Human Rights Committee" Canadian Human Rights 
Yearbook 1991-1992, 105 at 108. 
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In December 1991 Michael Toonen submitted a communication to the 
Human Rights Committee alleging that the Tasmanian Criminal Code 
1924 violated Australia's obligations under the ICCPR, namely article 17 
(right to privacy) and article 26 (right to equality), as it criminalized 
homosexuality.165 In November 1992 the communication was declared 
admissible and on 30 March 1994 the Committee made its decision.166 
The Committee was of the view that the Tasmanian Criminal Code 
violated Mr Toonen's privacy rights under article 17 of the ICCPR and 
as an effective remedy, sections 122(a), 122(c) and 123 of the Code 
should be repealed. The Committee refused to rule on article 26 of the 
ICCPR. The Tasmanian Government has to date refused to repeal the 
offending section of its Criminal Code. However the Federal 
Government has moved to implement the Committee's views by 
enacting the Human Rights (Sexual Conduct ) Act 1994 (assented to 19 
December 1994). Section 4(1) of the Act provides: 
4.(1) Sexual conduct involving only consenting adults acting in private is not 
to be subject, by or under any law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory, 
to any arbitrary interference with privacy within the meaning of Article 17 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
This Act shows that the Parliament of Australia 1s aware of its 
obligations under the ICCPR and has been careful not to attract 
criticism from the Human Rights Committee and other State parties by 
ignoring the Committee's views on this communication. 
Therefore, by showing that the Human Rights Committee views can 
compel States to provide remedies to individuals for the breach of their 
human rights through their follow-up procedures and as shown by the 
Toonen communication, the argument of the Court of Appeal in 
Baigent that the courts should have the power to order remedies for 
State violations of human rights prior to the Committee, is reinforced. 
Not only do communications to the Committee take an average of 
three years to process but the State exposes itself to international 
criticism if the Committee comes to the view that a violation of a 
citizen's human rights has occurred. The Court of Appeal by 
165 For a discussion of this communication see W Morgan, "Identifying Evil For What It 
Is: Tasmanian Sexual Perversity & the UN" (1994) 19(3) MULR 740. 
166 CCPR/C/50/0/488/1992. 
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interpreting the ratification of the Optional Protocol as allowing it to 
give domestic remedies for the breach of affirmed human rights has a 
legitimate argument in so far as it accords with common sense. Not 
only will the Court of Appeal provide the individual with a shorter 
and less expensive route in the redress of their human rights but the 
State will also benefit by avoiding the international embarrassment, if 
the Human Rights Committee comes to the view that the State has 
violated a citizen's human rights. 
In light of this analysis it can be concluded that the First Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR and the Human Rights Committee are an 
important and legitimate factor influencing the change in legal culture 
surrounding international human rights instruments. 
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Judicial Colloquium at Balliol College, Oxford, on the Judiciary 
and Human Rights, September 1992. 
Front row: Zullah CJ (Pakistan); &Ila CJ (Nigeria); Lord Mackay of Clash/em (LC); RymJal P 
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4.3. Judicial Colloquia on International Human Rights 
A series of High Level Judicial Colloquia which have addressed the 
issue of the domestic application of international human rights norms 
are an important factor behind the change in judicial attitude towards 
international human rights instruments. The first Judicial Colloquium 
which discussed this issue was held in Bangalore, India in February 
1988 and the participants included judges from both commonwealth 
and non-commonwealth nations.167 A comprehensive exchange of 
views and full discussion of expert papers took place at this conference 
with a statement of principles emerging as a result. The "Bangalore 
Principles"168, as they are referred to, acknowledged that fundamental 
human rights and freedoms are inherent in all humankind and find 
expression in constitutional and legal systems throughout the world 
and in the international human rights instruments.169 Although it was 
also acknowledged, that international human rights conventions are 
not directly enforceable in national courts unless they have been 
incorporated by legislation into domestic law, the growing tendency for 
national courts to have regard to the international norms for the 
purpose of deciding cases where the domestic law is uncertain or 
incomplete, was welcomed. The reason why this development was 
welcomed was because it reflected "the universality of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms and the vital role of an independent 
judiciary in reconciling the competing claims of individuals and 
groups of persons with the general interests of the community".170 The 
"Bangalore Principles" also stressed the need for education on the 
subject of international human rights at all levels of the legal 
establishment. Both judges and law students alike, it was stressed, need 
to be aware of this fast growing and important area of the law so that 
they can encourage universal respect for fundamental human rights 
and freedoms.171 
167 For a discussion of the Colloquium see MD Kirby, "Judicial Colloquium at Balliol 
College, Oxford, on the Judicial and Basic Rights, September 1992" (1993) 67 ALJ 63. 
168 MD Kirby, "The Role of the Judge in Advancing Human Rights by Reference to 
International Human Rights Norms" (1988) 62 ALJ 514 at 531. 
169 ibid., Principle 1. 
170 ibid., Principles 4 & 5. 
171 ibid., Principle 9. 
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These principles have gone on to be discussed, reaffirmed and 
developed in subsequent Judicial Colloquia held successively in Harare, 
Zimbabwe (1989); Banjul, The Gambia (1990); Abuja, Nigeria (1991); 
Balliol College, Oxford, England (1992); and Bloemfontein, South Africa 
(1993). The Bloemfontein Statement of 1993172 expressly affirmed the 
importance both of international human rights instruments and 
international and comparative case law, as essential points of reference 
for the interpretation of national constitutions and legislation and in 
the development of the common law. Fundamental human rights and 
freedoms were held to be more than just paper aspirations and that 
judges had to ensure that they were given real effect in the domestic 
law.173 
These Judicial Colloquia have had a definite effect on the thinking of 
commonwealth judges with respect to human rights. As well as 
educating some of the most influential judges in the commonwealth 
on the significance of fundamental human rights, they have also 
challenged these judges to develop the domestic law of their respective 
countries in a way which reflects the importance of human rights as 
contained in the various international human rights instruments. The 
Hon Justice M D Kirby, President of the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal, is an example of one commonwealth judge whose thinking, as 
reflected in his judicial decisions and extra-curial writings, has been 
greatly influenced by these Colloquia. Prior to attending the Judicial 
Colloquium in Bangalore, India, in February 1988, Kirby P admits that 
he was a faithful advocate of the common law principle that 
international law was not automatically incorporated into domestic 
law. On attending the Colloquium, he was exposed for the first time to 
the fast developing jurisprudence of international human rights 
norms. This led to what he describes as his "conversion", which was a 
realisation that fundamental human rights were inherent in human 
kind and that they provided important guidance in cases concerning 
172 For selected papers from this Colloquium see "1993 High Level Judicial Colloquium 
Bloemfontein, South Africa" (1993) 19(4) CLB 1644. 
173 ibid., at 1646. 
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basis human rights and freedoms.174 
Kirby P' s "conversion" has clearly affected his judicial decisions post-
Bangalore. This is shown by his willingness to refer to international 
human rights instruments when interpreting domestic statutes which 
affect a person's fundamental human rights. In Daemar v Industrial 
Commission of New South Wales & Ors175, the issue before the New 
South Wales Court of Appeal was whether the Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth) provided that proceedings for the vindication of a public right 
were stayed during the bankruptcy of the petitioner. Kirby P in 
discussing this issue referred to the ICCPR which sets out the right of 
access to the courts. Although the other judges of the Court did not 
refer to the ICCPR, Kirby P took it as a touchstone for indicating the 
basic matters of approach which should be taken by the Court in 
tackling the construction of the statute.176 In Jago v District Court of 
New South Wales & Orsl77, where the question was raised of whether 
under the common law a person accused of a criminal charge had a 
legally enforceable right to a speedy trial, Kirby P again made reference 
to the ICCPR. He stated that where the common law is unclear a 
relevant source of guidance may be the statements of human rights 
found in international instruments. International instruments he 
asserted, were a more reliable source of guidance than the 800 hundred 
years of legal history which counsel had referred to in arguing whether 
there was a right to a speedy trial. The case went on appeal to the High 
Court of Australia, where no reference was made to the international 
human rights instruments.178 Kirby P in his dissenting judgment in 
Cachia v Hanes & Anor179 was supported in his view, that a litigant 
could recover all costs and expenses incurred to represent himself in 
court, by article 14(1) of the ICCPR which provided that all persons 
174 M Kirby," The Australian Use of International Human Rights Norms: From 
Bangalore to Balliol- A View From the Antipodes" (1993) 16(2) UNSWLJ 363 at 364. 
175 (1988) 12 NSWLR 45; 79 ALR 591 (CA). 
176 see also Sand M Motor Repairs Pty Limited & Ors v Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty 
Limited & Anor (1988) 12 NSWLR 358 (CA), where Kirby P reiterates this view that 
the ICCPR provides the starting point in the statement of principles which placed in 
context, the dispute between the parties . 
177 (1988) 12 NSWLR 558 (CA). 
178 Jago v District Court of New 5011th Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23. 
179 (1991) 23 NSWLR 304. 
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"shall be equal before the courts and tribunals". From this fundamental 
principle he derived the principle that litigants should not suffer 
discrimination because they are not represented by lawyers. 
Kirby P's attitude towards international human rights, as the above case 
examples illustrate, was clearly the result of his attendance and 
education at the Judicial Colloquium at Bangalore and at subsequent 
Colloquia. With the decisions of the High Court in Mabo and Teoh it 
can be concluded that Kirby P is no longer a lone advocate of the 
importance on international human rights to the interpretation and 
development of the domestic law.180 Kirby P interpreted the Ma bo 
decision, where Brennan J held that international law was a legitimate 
influence on the development of the common law, as:181 
... an extremely bold step. Pointing the way to the future development of the 
Australian common law in harmony with developing principles of 
international law, just as the Bangalore Principles had suggested. 
New Zealand's President of the Court of Appeal Sir Robin Cooke has 
attended a number of the Judicial Colloquia on international human 
rights, delivering a paper at the Judicial Colloquium at Balliol College, 
Oxford.182 The extent to which his thinking has been influenced by the 
Judicial Colloquia is more difficult to measure as he has not been so 
forthright in his praise of the Colloquia as Kirby P. One example where 
he has referred to the Colloquia was in his judgment in Tavita. After 
stating that "the law as to the bearing on domestic law of international 
human rights and instruments declaring them is undergoing 
evolution", he referred to the Balliol Statement of 1992 which was 
reaffirmed in the Bloemfontein Statement of 1993, stating that the duty 
of the judiciary is to interpret and apply national constitutions, 
ordinary legislation and the common law in the light of the 
universality of human rights.183 He was obviously influenced by the 
Colloquia, as his decision in Tavita represents a major change in the 
180 Kirby P continues to advocate the Bangalore Principles and with renewed vigour 
since Mabo, see Regina v Greer (1992) 62 A Crim R 442; R v Asti/1 (1992) 63 A Crim R 
148; Director of Public Prosecutions for the Commonwealth v Saxon (1992) 28 NSWLR 
263. 
181 M Kirby (supra n 174) at 386. 
182 Sir R Cooke, " Empowerment and Accountability: The Quest for Administrative 
Justice" (1992) 18(2) CLB 1326. 
183 Tavita (supra n 37) at 266. 
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way that the judiciary are approaching international human rights 
instruments. 
4.4 The Legal Profession 
Lawyers who advocate arguments that promote the use of 
international human rights instruments in interpreting the domestic 
law have also played a key role in altering the traditional attitude of the 
courts towards international instruments. Anthony Shaw, barrister and 
Lecturer in Law at Victoria University of Wellington, through his 
persistent arguing in the Court of Appeal advocating the importance of 
international human rights instruments in the interpretation of the 
domestic law, has been an important figure in causing this change in 
attitude. He was one of the counsel for the appellants in Ashby, where 
it was argued that the Minister for Immigration should have regard to 
the CERD when exercising his discretion under the Immigration Act 
1964. With the enactment of the Bill of Rights, he has been co-counsel 
in many Bill of Rights cases where it has been argued that the courts 
should refer to the ICCPR and the accompanying international 
jurisprudence in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. He was co-
counsel for the appellants in R v Goodwin (No2), where the Court of 
Appeal accepted the argument that the jurisprudence of the Human 
Rights Committee is of considerable persuasive authority in the 
interpretation of section 22 of the Bill of Rights. He was also co-counsel 
for the appellants in the cases of R v B, Martin v District Court of 
Tauranga and Baigent, where the Court of Appeal accepted arguments 
advocating international human rights instruments m the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights. By advancing arguments based on 
international human rights instruments, A Shaw has been an 
important influence not only in educating the judiciary of the 
importance of international human rights instruments and 
international jurisprudence on human rights but also in challenging 
the judiciary to apply these instruments and jurisprudence in domestic 
law. 
Dr R Harrison is another New Zealand barrister who has continued to 
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argue m the courts the importance of international human rights 
instrument and international human rights jurisprudence to domestic 
law. He was co-counsel with A Shaw in Ashby, was leading counsel for 
the successful appellants in Auckland Unemployed Worker's Rights 
Centre Inc v Attorney-General184 and was counsel for the plaintiffs in 
Ankers v Attorney-General. 
As lawyers play an important part in this emerging legal culture they 
need to be educated on the subject of international human rights so 
that this legal culture can continue to develop. The New Zealand Law 
Society recognised this need for education as in June 1995 it held a 
Seminar on Human Rights. The aim of the Seminar was to educate 
interested members of the legal profession on the growing importance 
of human rights in New Zealand law and society today. Distinguished 
international and national speakers addressed the Seminar on issues 
relating to human rights. International, regional and national 
mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights were all discussed at 
length. Dr R Harrison gave part of a paper addressing the issue of the 
importation into domestic law of international human rights. In 
discussing the current developments in this area of the law, this paper 
is indicative of the emerging legal culture surrounding international 
human rights instruments.185 
4.5 Conclusion 
Therefore there are three principle factors which are influencing the 
change in legal culture surrounding international human rights 
instruments. The most obvious factor is the influence on the judiciary 
of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Human Rights 
Committee. The Courts fear that if they do not apply the principles of 
the international human rights instruments where they are relevant to 
issues raised in domestic law, they will face international criticism. The 
second important factor are the Judicial Colloquia which discuss 
184 [1994] 3 NZLR 720; (1994) 1 HRNZ 106. This case was argued conjointly with 
Bai gent. 
185 This paper is reproduced at [1994] NZLJ 256. 
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international human rights issues. In educating members of the 
Commonwealth's judiciary on the importance of international human 
rights instruments to domestic law issues, these Colloquia challenge 
the judiciary to refer to these instruments in their decisions. The third 
important factor influencing this emerging legal culture is the 
persistent presentation to the courts, by certain New Zealand barristers, 
of reasoned arguments concerning the relevance of international 
human rights instruments to the domestic law. Judges have been 
educated on the importance of international human rights 
instruments through these arguments and this in turn has lead to a 
change in judicial attitude towards them, influencing an overall 
change in the legal culture surrounding these instruments. 
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CONCLUSION 
... it is essential that we strive to develop a culture of respect for 
internationally stated human rights norms which results in 
those norms being applied in domestic law through the courts. 
Domestic courts must have regard to international human 
rights norms whether or not they have been incorporated into 
the domestic law and whether or not a country is party to 
a particular instrument. Fundamental human rights and 
freedoms are inherent in human kind.186 
Within New Zealand's legal profession there is an emerging 'culture of 
respect for internationally stated human rights norms' which is 
resulting in these international norms being incorporated into the 
domestic law. This emerging legal culture represents a radical 
departure from the traditional approach of the courts towards 
international conventional law, where the courts were very reluctant 
to import the terms of international conventions into the domestic 
law. The 1994 decision of the Court of Appeal, Tavita, marks a 
significant turning point in the judicial recognition of international 
human rights norms in domestic law. In this case Cooke P asserted that 
international instruments were more than mere 'window-dressing'187, 
implying that courts would no longer tolerate statutory decision-
makers ignoring international human rights norms, where they are 
relevant to their decisions. 
The reaction of the lower courts to Tavita, emphasises that this 
emerging legal culture only applies to international human rights 
instruments and of these instruments only those which deal with civil 
and political rights as opposed to social and economic rights. Of the 
courts and tribunals in New Zealand, the Family Court has been the 
most embracing of the emerging legal culture spearheaded by Tavita. In 
two important cases Re the S Children (No 2) and Re the W Children, 
this Court has shown that it is willing to refer to the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 to interpret the CYPFA and 
186 Hon Mr Justice E Dumbutshcna, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, 
"Human Rights in the 21st Century" In 9th Conmzonwenlth Law Conference : conference 
papers (1990) 603 at 605. 
187 Tnvita (supra n 37) at 266. 
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when it is required to exercise its discretion under the CYPFA. An 
argument has been advanced that this use of the Convention by the 
Family Court will add little that is new to family law. This argument 
may be a reflection of the similarity in principles between the CYPFA 
and the Convention, however it cannot be ignored that the Family 
Court now recognises the legitimacy of reference to the Convention in 
developing the law in New Zealand. 
This emerging legal culture can also be seen in the judicial approach to 
the interpretation of statutes, such as the Bill of Rights and the ECA, 
which recognise fundamental human rights. The judiciary has now 
shown that it is willing to refer to international human rights 
instruments and international jurisprudence when deciding human 
rights issues under these Acts. 
This 'culture of respect' for international human rights norms and 
instruments can also be seen in Australia, England and to a more 
limited extent in Canada. The High Court of Australia in Teoh held 
that the ratification of the International Convention on the Rights of 
the Child gave rise to a "legitimate expectation" that decision-makers 
would act in conformity with the Convention. This is tantamount to 
holding that the Convention is a relevant consideration to a statutory 
decision and so illustrates the revolutionary attitude that the High 
Court of Australia has towards the effect of international instruments 
in domestic law. The High Court of Australia in Mabo and the English 
Court of Appeal in Derbyshire, have also tentatively accepted that 
international human rights instruments can be used to develop the 
common law. This again illustrates the enhanced role that these 
instruments are having on the development of the domestic law. The 
Canadian judiciary have not shown the same enthusiasm in using 
international human rights instruments in the development of 
Canadian domestic law. However some members of the Canadian 
judiciary lead by Dickson CJC, have held that international human 
rights law is a relevant and persuasive source in the interpretation of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The fact that this 
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'culture of respect' for international human rights norms and 
instruments is being reflected in other common-law jurisdictions, 
besides New Zealand, reinforces its legitimacy. With the support of 
many distinguished members of the Commonwealth's judiciary this 
legal culture will be more difficult to denounce by those who oppose it. 
Three important factors discussed in this paper which are influencing 
this change in legal culture include, the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR 
which allows individuals to take their human rights complaints to the 
United Nation's Human Rights Committee, the series of High Level 
Judicial Colloquia which discuss international human rights issues and 
the arguments of enlightened lawyers who are challenging the 
judiciary to refer to international human rights law in their decisions. 
Underlying this legal culture and the factors which are influencing it, is 
a recognition of the universal nature of fundamental human rights 
which are inherent in human kind. People hold human rights by 
virtue of being human persons, there being no distinction depending 
on what State a person lives in. International human rights 
instruments are also strikingly different from the more classical 
international conventions, in that their concern is for individual 
citizens not for relations between States. One senior Australian judge 
has stated that to ignore international human rights principles in 
today's world is "akin to persisting with the horse and cart in the age of 
interplanetary flight, nuclear physics, and the microchip."188 This 
statement reflects the very contempory nature of human rights law, 
which is challenging the judiciary to abandon their traditional 
approach towards international instruments. 
Baigent is a significant decision in that the Court of Appeal in deciding 
that it had a general remedial jurisdiction under the Bill of Rights, 
effectively imported article 2(3) of the ICCPR into the Bill of Rights. 
This importation of article 2(3) into New Zealand's domestic law, takes 
the approach of the Court of Appeal towards international human 
rights instruments in Tavita, one step further. It can be argued that the 
Court of Appeal also went further than the Family Court, in its 
188 M Kirby, (supra n 155) at 1271. 
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decisions which have followed Tavita. In Tavita, the Court of Appeal 
hesitated in importing the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child into the domestic law, by 
declining to finally decide whether the provisions of international 
human rights instruments were mandatory relevant considerations in 
statutory decisions which affect an individual's human rights. The 
Family Court has taken the comments of Cooke P in Tavita concerning 
the importance of international human rights instruments to the the 
development of the domestic law very seriously, using the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child in the interpretation of the CYPFA and in 
guiding its discretion under the CYPFA. The Family Court though, has 
not gone as far as to import provisions of the Convention into the 
domestic law. In Baigent the Court of Appeal took the step of importing 
a provision of an international human rights instrument into the 
domestic law. This is a major development in the domestic law with 
respect to international human rights instruments. 
In order to understand and legitimize Baigent it must be examined in 
the context of this changing legal culture surrounding international 
human rights. This paper has endeavoured to show that there is a 
changing legal culture surrounding international human rights 
instruments. Baigent is part of this changing legal culture. It can be 
compared with the decision of the High Court of Australia, Teoh, and 
argued to be just as revolutionary. Whether there will be a political 
backlash to this decision as there was in Australia to Teoh, remains to 
be seen. It is my argument that this decision should be applauded, as 
long as it is realised that the importation of the provisions of 
international instruments into domestic law only applies to 
international human rights instruments. The Court of Appeal in 
Baigent, recognised the universal nature of human rights which are 
fundamental and anterior to domestic law. Bnigent therefore forces us, 
as members of the legal profession to become more internationalist in 
our outlook. This is a new development in our legal system, which 
challenges orthodox views concerning the role of judges in developing 
the law and for this reason alone it will attract condemnation. The law 
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is constantly changing and the area of human rights law for it to be 
effective and to adequately safeguard individual's human rights, 
challenges lawyers and judges to disregard their traditional approach 
towards international instruments and embrace the use of 
international human rights instruments in the development of the 
domestic law. Baigent and its endorsement of the changing legal 
culture surrounding international human rights instruments 
represents the way of the future in the area of human rights law. The 
legitimacy of this decision will be cemented once the legal profession 
takes up the challenge in using international human rights 
instruments and the accompanying international jurisprudence to 
develop the domestic law . 
• • 
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